





The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions
over the Life Cycle and Implications 
for Regulation
ABSTRACT Many consumers make poor ﬁnancial choices, and older adults
are particularly vulnerable to such errors. About half of the population between
ages 80 and 89 have a medical diagnosis of substantial cognitive impairment. We
study life-cycle patterns in ﬁnancial mistakes using a proprietary database with
information on 10 types of credit transactions. Financial mistakes include sub-
optimal use of credit card balance transfer offers and excess interest rate and fee
payments. In a cross section of prime borrowers, middle-aged adults made fewer
ﬁnancial mistakes than either younger or older adults. We conclude that ﬁnan-
cial mistakes follow a U-shaped pattern, with the cost-minimizing performance
occurring around age 53. We analyze nine regulatory strategies that may help
individuals avoid ﬁnancial mistakes. We discuss laissez-faire, disclosure, nudges,
ﬁnancial “driver’s licenses,” advance directives, ﬁduciaries, asset safe harbors,
and ex post and ex ante regulatory oversight. Finally, we pose seven questions
for future research on cognitive limitations and associated policy responses.
M
ost households in the United States have accumulated a substantial
pool of wealth by the time they retire. Among households with a head
aged 65–74, median net worth—including net home equity but excluding
public and private deﬁned-beneﬁt claims—was $239,400 in 2007, accord-
ing to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
1 Moreover, household
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1. For this group of households, mean net worth, again excluding defined-benefit
accounts, was $1,015,700 in 2007. However, the mean is dominated by the right tail of the
distribution, and saving for these households is motivated by many considerations other than
retirement (particularly the desire to make bequests and the need for capital in ongoing pri-
vately held businesses).
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 51wealth is likely to grow much more quickly than income in the next three
decades, as more and more households experience a full career’s worth of
accumulation in deﬁned-contribution pension accounts such as 401(k)s.
2
In addition to their accumulated assets, households with a head aged
65–74 often have a complex set of balance sheet liabilities: the SCF reports
that in 2007, 47.9 percent had debt secured by a residential property,
26.1 percent had installment loans, and 37 percent carried credit card
balances from month to month. Nearly two-thirds (65.5 percent) of house-
holds in this age range had at least one form of debt.
In this paper we seek to raise a red ﬂag about the increasingly large and
complex balance sheets of older adults. Substantial retirement savings are
critical for the well-being of this group in light of the increasing average
length of retirement, the rising expectation of independent living through
most of retirement, and more modest deﬁned-beneﬁt ﬂows for most retirees.
However, many older adults are not in a good position to manage their
ﬁnances, or even to delegate that management safely to others. We docu-
ment this concern in four ways.
First, we review the literature on age-based patterns in cognitive func-
tion. Performance on novel cognitive tasks—what psychologists call ﬂuid
intelligence—declines dramatically over one’s adult life. In the cross section,
the fluid intelligence of the average individual falls by about 1 percentile
unit each year from age 20 to age 80 (Salthouse forthcoming and authors’
calculations). Many mechanisms contribute to explaining this pattern,
including (confounding) cohort effects, normal aging effects, and dementia.
The prevalence of dementia explodes after age 60, doubling with every ﬁve
years of age to more than 30 percent after age 85 (Ferri and others 2005).
Moreover, many older adults without a strict diagnosis of dementia still
experience substantial cognitive impairment. For example, the prevalence
of the diagnosis “cognitive impairment without dementia” is nearly 30 per-
cent between ages 80 and 89.
3 Drawing these facts together, about half the
population aged 80–89 have a diagnosis of either dementia or cognitive
impairment without dementia.
Second, we supplement these existing ﬁndings with new longitudinal
evidence from the University of Michigan’s Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). Our new evidence eliminates the confound of cohort effects by
52 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
2. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2008). Today fewer than half of the private sector workforce
have a defined-contribution plan at their current employer. However, current legislative
proposals are likely to expand coverage.
3. Plassman and others (2008). They deﬁne cognitive impairment without dementia as a
Dementia Severity Rating Scale score between 6 and 11.
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we ﬁnd even stronger age-based patterns. Our results imply that age-based
selection effects are very strong—the most impaired subjects tend to drop
out of these surveys—explaining why cross-sectional patterns of cognitive
decline understate the true age-based decline.
Third, using a new dataset, we document a link between age and the
quality of ﬁnancial decisionmaking in debt markets. In a cross section of
prime borrowers, middle-aged adults borrow at lower interest rates and
pay less in fees than do either younger or older adults. Averaging results
across 10 different types of credit transactions, we ﬁnd that fee and interest
payments are minimized around age 53. These measured effects are not
explained by differences in observed risk characteristics. Combining
multiple datasets, neither do we ﬁnd evidence that selection effects or cohort
effects explain our results. The leading explanation for the patterns that we
observe is that experience and acquired knowledge rise with age, but ﬂuid
intelligence declines with it.
Fourth, we review the contributions of other authors who have studied
age effects on ﬁnancial decisionmaking. A small but rapidly growing body of
convergent research highlights the cognitive vulnerabilities of older adults.
Questions remain about the identiﬁcation of age, cohort, and time effects.
Moreover, even if we were certain that older adults make many suboptimal
ﬁnancial decisions, it is not clear what society should do about it.
We next present a discussion of mutually compatible policy options for
addressing the identiﬁed problems. Although some of our ﬁeld evidence
suggests that younger adults are also at risk, our regulatory analysis empha-
sizes older adults, for four reasons. First, older adults have much more at
stake, since they control far more ﬁnancial resources, both absolutely and
as a fraction of their total net worth, than people in their 20s. Second, older
adults cannot as easily bounce back from their ﬁnancial mistakes, since
their cognitive and physical disabilities frequently make it difﬁcult to return
to work. Third, younger adults may make frequent financial mistakes,
but they rarely have severe cognitive incapacity. The behavior of a foolish
20-year-old credit card user bears little comparison to that of an 80-year-
old suffering from dementia. For example, one regularly hears stories
about friends’ aging relatives who lend or give a substantial fraction of
their wealth to con artists (see, for example, Choi-Allum 2009). Fourth, in
the United States at least, retirees effectively have fewer regulatory pro-
tections than do most workers. This is an unintended consequence of the
nation’s system of defined-contribution retirement savings. Defined-
contribution pension accounts are stringently regulated by the Employee
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eventually roll their accumulated balances out of ERISA-regulated accounts
into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which are regulated with a
much lighter touch. For example, the broker-dealer securities ﬁrms that
manage most IRAs have no ﬁduciary duty toward their customers. Thus,
the system currently provides the least regulation for precisely the age group
with the greatest vulnerability.
We identify and discuss nine policy options, listed here in approximate
order from least to most paternalistic:
—Laissez-faire
—Increased disclosure
—“Libertarian paternalism” (the greater use of advice, defaults, and
other nudges)
—Financial “driver’s licenses”
—Advance directives (instructions set out today against a future loss
of competence)
—Expanded ﬁduciary requirements
—Protection of assets through sequestration in known safe investments
(“safe harbors”)
—Default regulatory approval of ﬁnancial products, with ex post sanc-
tions for violation of standards
—Mandatory ex ante regulatory review of ﬁnancial products.
We discuss the pros and cons of each of these different regulatory models,
without arguing for the adoption of any one of them. We believe that natural
experiments are needed to determine their efﬁcacy, and we recognize that
the stronger interventions have the potential to generate large social costs
as well as beneﬁts.
Finally, we identify seven critical research questions that need to be
answered before policymakers can identify an optimal regulatory design.
These questions highlight how little is currently known about the ﬁnancial
choices of older adults.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses medical and
psychological evidence on changes in cognitive function over the life cycle.
Section II discusses evidence from the HRS on age-based changes in
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4. ERISA requires plans to provide participants with information about the plan, including
important information about plan features and funding; establishes ﬁduciary responsibilities
for those who manage and control plan assets; requires plans to establish a grievance and
appeals process for participants; and gives participants the right to sue for benefits and
over breaches of ﬁduciary duty. (See the U.S. Department of Labor’s webpage on ERISA at
www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm.)
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the evidence on errors made by older adults in debt markets. Section IV
discusses the broader literature on economic decisionmaking over the
life cycle. Section V analyzes the nine policy approaches listed above.
Section VI concludes by posing our seven questions for future research.
I. Psychological and Medical Evidence on Cognitive Decline
among Older Adults
Fluid intelligence (performance on novel tasks) can be measured along
many different dimensions, including working memory, reasoning, spatial
visualization, and cognitive processing speed. Figure 1, from a forthcoming
paper by Timothy Salthouse, illustrates each of these kinds of tasks.
Fluid intelligence shows a robust age pattern in cross-sectional datasets
of adults (Cattell 1987; Salthouse 2005; Salthouse forthcoming). Adults in
their early 20s score on average about 0.7 standard deviation above the
adult mean, and adults in their early 80s about 1.0 standard deviation below
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Source: Salthouse (forthcoming). Reprinted with permission. 
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Study the following words and then write 
as many as you can remember
Select the best completion of the missing 
cell in the matrix
Classify the pairs as same (S) or different 
(D) as quickly as possible
Select the object on the right that 
corresponds to the pattern on the left
Figure 1. Examples of Memory and Analytical Tests
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Source: Salthouse (forthcoming). Reprinted with permission. 
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5. There is also a growing literature that identiﬁes age-related changes in the nature as
opposed to the quality of cognition (see Park and Schwarz 2000; Denburg, Tranel, and Bechara
2005). Mather and Carstensen (2005) and Carstensen (2006) identify age-related variation in
cognitive preferences. Subjects with short time horizons and older subjects attend to negative
information relatively less than do subjects with long time horizons or younger subjects.
the mean. This implies a decline of about 1 percentile of the total adult
population per year after age 20, assuming the distribution is Gaussian.
Indeed, this decline is remarkably smooth from age 20 to age 90 (ﬁgure 2).
The measured pattern results from some combination of true age effects,
cohort effects (Flynn 1984), and selection effects. We return to the issue
of identification of age effects in the next section, where we report new
evidence from the HRS.
Neurological pathologies represent one important pathway for age effects
on performance in older adults. For instance, dementia is primarily attrib-
utable to Alzheimer’s disease (in about 60 percent of cases) and vascular
disease (in about 25 percent). The prevalence of dementia doubles with
every ﬁve additional years of life (Ferri and others 2005; Fratiglioni, De
Ronchi, and Agüero-Torres 1999).
5 For example, the top panel of table 1
reports that the prevalence of dementia in North America rises from 3.3 per-
cent at ages 70–74 to 6.5 percent at ages 75–79, 12.8 percent at ages 80–84,
and 30.1 percent for adults at least 85 years of age (Ferri and others 2005).
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 56AGARWAL, DRISCOLL, GABAIX, and LAIBSON 57
6. Experience may be acquired directly, or it may be acquired indirectly through commu-
nication with peers. As people build up their social networks over their lifetime, their external
sources of experience become better and better developed. However, these networks tend to
fray as individuals retire and leave well-developed work-based relationships. Peer mortality
also contributes to a late-life decline of social networks. These channels suggest that the expe-
riential knowledge derived from social networks follows a concave life-cycle pattern.
Table 1. Prevalence of Cognitive Impairment by Age in North America
Percent







85 and over 30.1 27.9–32.3
Cognitive impairment without dementia
71–79 16.0 11.5–20.5
80–89 29.2 24.3–34.1
90 and over 38.8 25.6–52.0
All ages 22.0 18.5–22.5
Sources: Ferri and others (2005); erratum to Plassman and others (2008).
Many older adults suffer from a less severe form of cognitive impairment,
which is diagnosed as cognitive impairment without dementia. The preva-
lence of this diagnosis rises from 16.0 percent at ages 71–79 to 29.2 percent
at ages 80–89 (bottom panel of table 1). All told, about half of adults in their
80s suffer from either dementia or cognitive impairment without dementia.
Age-driven declines in fluid intelligence, however, are partly offset
by age-related increases in crystallized intelligence (sometimes called
experience or knowledge).
6 Most day-to-day tasks, such as buying the right
amount of milk at the grocery store, rely on both fluid and crystallized
intelligence. For most tasks we hypothesize that net performance is hump-
shaped with respect to age. Formally, this would result from the following
conditions: general task performance is determined by the sum of fluid
and crystallized capital, crystallized capital accumulates with diminishing
returns (for m < n, the nth learning experience generates less crystallized
capital than the mth), and ﬂuid capital falls linearly (or perhaps concavely)
over the life cycle (ﬁgure 3). Consequently, middle-aged adults may be at
a decisionmaking sweet spot: they have substantial practical experience and
have not yet suffered signiﬁcant declines in ﬂuid intelligence. Supporting this
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example, those testing vocabulary and other types of acquired knowledge—
follow a hump-shaped pattern (Salthouse 2005).
II. Evidence from the HRS
The medical and psychological evidence on age-based patterns in cognitive
function reviewed in the previous section is confounded by cohort effects
and selection effects. In any cross section of subjects, the older subjects
not only are older but also were born in different cohorts from the others.
Moreover, these patterns are affected by different selection mechanisms. For
example, older adults have relatively more health problems (both physical
and cognitive) that cause them to selectively drop out of surveys.
II.A. Evidence from the Main HRS Sample
In light of these problems, it is useful to analyze data that follow individ-
uals longitudinally. The HRS is an excellent source for such analysis for
cognitive variables (Ofstedal, Fisher, and Herzog 2005; McArdle, Smith,
and Willis forthcoming). Since its beginning in 1992, the HRS has surveyed
a nationally representative sample of more than 22,000 Americans over the
age of 50. These longitudinal surveys are conducted every two years. For
reasons of data comparability, we use all of the waves from 1993 to 2006.
7
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7. See Ofstedal and others (2005) for a complete description of the cognitive scales in
the HRS.
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analysis (mirroring the methods described in the previous section) that sim-
ply plots mean performance by age (in integer years), ignoring the potential
role of cohort and selection effects. Second, we conduct a “controlled”
analysis that traces out the performance trajectory using onlyintra-individual
differences. To do this, we calculate the slope at age a as the average slope
for all subjects who are observed in adjacent survey waves straddling age a.
8
In other words, the slope at integer age a is calculated as
where xi,w is the task performance of subject i in HRS wave w, Ai,w is the
decimal age of subject i in wave w, Ω(a) is the set of subjects who appear in
adjacent waves at ages straddling age a, and N is the cardinality of Ω. Note
that this average slope implicitly controls for person ﬁxed effects, since the
slope is calculated by averaging individual slopes.
We then trace out the life-cycle trajectory using these average slopes,
starting from the value of the naive analysis at an initial age. To reduce
sampling noise, the initial age is chosen as the ﬁrst age for which we have at
least 1,000 observations in our combined sample (including all of the HRS
waves from 1992 to 2006).
The top left panel of ﬁgure 4 plots naive and controlled performance in
the immediate word recall task. The interviewer reads a list of 10 simple
nouns, and the respondent is immediately asked to recall as many of them
as possible, in any order. At age 51 the average performance is 6.2 words out
of 10. By age 90 the average (controlled) performance is 3.0 words out of 10.
The top right panel of ﬁgure 4 plots naive and controlled performance in
the delayed word recall task. This is the same as the previous task except
that a second task taking about ﬁve minutes intervenes between recitation
and recall. At age 51 the average performance is 5.4 words out of 10. By
age 90 the average (controlled) performance is 2.1 words out of 10.
The middle left panel of figure 4 plots naive and controlled perfor-
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8. In our notation, responses at dates t and t′ are adjacent if⎟ t′−t⎟ < 5 years and the
respondent does not answer the same question at another date t″ between t and t′. For exam-
ple, if a speciﬁc question was not included in the 2004 wave but was included in the 2002
and 2006 waves (and the respondent answered the question in both those waves), then the
adjacent responses would be in 2002 and 2006. Two decimal ages A < A′ straddle integer age
a iff A < a < A′.
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Chance of disease question Split lottery question
Sources: HRS data and authorsí calc ulations.
a. See the text for descriptions of the tasks.
b. Controlling for cohort and selection effects.
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1 point awarded for each successful subtraction. At age 51 the average
score is 3.2 out of 5. By age 90 the average (controlled) score is 2.2 out of 5.
The middle right panel of ﬁgure 4 plots naive and controlled perfor-
mance in the Telephone Interview of Cognitive Status (TICS) task. The
researcher asks the respondent the following 10 questions and assigns 
1 point for each correct answer: What is the current year? What is the
current month? What is the current day of the month? What is the current
day of the week? What do you usually use to cut paper? What do you
call the kind of prickly plant that grows in the desert? Who is the current
president? Who is the current vice president? Count backward from 20 to
10 (twice). At age 63 the average score is 9.2 out of 10. By age 90 the aver-
age (controlled) score is 7.5.
Finally, we present two measures of practical numeracy. The bottom
left panel of ﬁgure 4 plots naive and controlled performance in response to
the following question: If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how
many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease? At age 53,
79 percent of subjects answer correctly. By age 90, 50 percent answer
correctly.
The bottom right panel of ﬁgure 4 plots naive and controlled performance
in response to the following question: If ﬁve people all have the winning
numbers in the lottery and the prize is $2 million, how much will each of
them get? We believe that this question is imprecisely posed, since the
logical answer could be either $2 million or $400,000. However, the results
are still interesting, since the fraction answering $400,000 (the official
correct answer) drops precipitously with age. At age 53, 52 percent answer
$400,000. By age 90, only 10 percent do.
II.B. Evidence from ADAMS Data
The Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study (ADAMS) of the
National Institute on Aging conducts in-person clinical assessments of
cognitive function and dementia for a subsample of HRS respondents
(Langa and others 2005). The ADAMS uses a much smaller sample than
the HRS. Only 856 respondents were surveyed in the initial 2002 ADAMS
wave. We use both the 2002 wave and a follow-up wave in 2006.
Figure 5 plots naive and controlled Clinical Dementia Ratings (CDRs)
for the ADAMS sample (using just the 2000 wave), using sampling weights
to correct for overrepresentation of certain groups. The CDR score is on a
0-to-4 scale, where 0 is healthy. A score of 
1⁄2 represents very mild dementia;
1 represents mild dementia; 2 represents moderate dementia; 3 represents
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9. See “Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR) Scale,” Washington University, St. Louis
(alzheimer.wustl.edu/cdr/PDFs/CDR_OverviewTranscript-Revised.pdf) for a description.


















Source: ADAMS data and authors’ calculations.
severe dementia; 4 is the highest dementia rating on the scale.
9 Scoring is
done by a panel of clinicians who base their judgments on the entire battery
of tests in the ADAMS. Hence, the CDR has a very high signal-to-noise
ratio, since the CDR score is derived from hundreds of survey questions
posed to a respondent and his or her caregivers. At age 75 the average score
is 0.4, which is near the threshold for “very mild” dementia. At age 99 the
average (control) score is 3.2, implying that the average respondent has
severe dementia.
Note that ﬁgure 5 shows a large gap between the naive average and the
controlled average CDR scores. The naive averages are highly misleading,
since they are affected by selection bias.
II.C. Summary of Evidence from the HRS
The HRS data paint a clear picture of declining cognitive function with
age. They also suggest that selection effects may be more important than
cohort effects. Cohort effects are predicted to cause the naive proﬁles to
fall more steeply than the control profiles, since older cohorts have fewer
educational advantages. Selection effects, in contrast, should cause the
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viduals with the poorest cognitive function tend to exit the sample. Selec-
tion bias seems to be more important in the HRS data, since our controlled
proﬁles are steeper than our naive proﬁles.
III. Financial Services and Age: Evidence on the Inverse 
U-Shape of Performance
In this section we document a U-shaped curve with age in the prices people
pay in 10 different types of credit transactions: credit card balance transfer
offers, home equity loans, home equity lines of credit, automobile loans,
mortgages, personal credit cards, small business credit cards, credit card late
payment fees, credit card overlimit fees, and credit card cash advance fees.
We discuss three forms of prices paid: interest rates (measured as annual
percentage rates, or APRs), fee payments, and balance transfer costs.
In each case we conduct a regression analysis that identiﬁes age effects
and controls for observable factors that might explain the patterns by age.
Thus, unless otherwise noted, in each context we estimate a regression of
the following type:
where F is a measure of the price paid by the borrower (for example, 
the APR), “controls” is a vector of control variables intended to capture
alternative explanations in each context (for example, measures of credit
risk), and “spline(age)” is a piecewise linear function that takes the con-
sumer’s age as its argument, with knot points at ages 30, 40, 50, 60, and 70.
We then plot the ﬁtted values for the spline on age, computing the intercept
using the sample means for the controls. The regressions are either pooled
panel or cross-sectional regressions, depending on the context.
10
Below we discuss the nature of the products and the prices paid, pre-
sent graphs of ﬁtted values on the spline coefﬁcients, and discuss possible
explanations for our ﬁndings. We describe the data in the appendix and
provide summary statistics for the datasets and the regression results in the
online appendix.
11
() ( ) , 1 F =+× +× + αβ γ ε spline age controls
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10. As variants, we tried having knot points at every ﬁve years, and replacing the spline
with a set of dummy variables for age. The results were qualitatively and quantitatively sim-
ilar, also showing a U-shaped pattern by age.
11. Online appendices for all papers in this issue may be found on the Brookings Papers
webpage (www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea) under “Conferences and Papers.”
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 63III.A. Three Financial Choices
We ﬁrst examine three of the above ﬁnancial transactions: credit card
balance transfer offers, home equity loans, and home equity lines of credit.
The U-shaped pattern by age for suboptimal balance transfer behavior is a
relatively clean example and thereby merits special emphasis. In the other
two cases we are able to tease out the mechanism leading to higher interest
payments for younger and older borrowers, namely, mistakes made in esti-
mating the value of one’s home.
EUREKA MOMENTS: OPTIMIZING THE USE OF CREDIT CARD BALANCE TRANSFERS.
Credit card holders frequently receive offers to transfer account balances
from an existing card to a new card charging a substantially lower APR for
an initial period from six months to a year or more (a “teaser” rate). The
catch is that all payments on the new card are applied ﬁrst to the transferred
balance, and to new purchases (which are subject to a higher APR) only
after the transferred balance has been paid off.
The optimal strategy for the cardholder during the teaser-rate period,
then, is to make all new purchases on the old credit card and none on the
new card until all the transferred balances have been paid off. We catego-
rize cardholders in our dataset by the speed with which they converge on
this optimal strategy. Some (about one-third) identify this optimal strat-
egy immediately, before making any purchases with the new card. Others
(slightly more than one-third) never identify the optimal strategy during the
teaser rate period. The remaining third discover it after one or more billing
cycles as they observe their surprisingly high interest charges. These bor-
rowers make purchases for one or more months and then have a “eureka”
moment, after which they implement the optimal strategy.
12
The top panel of figure 6 plots the frequency of eureka moments for
each of five age groups. The plot of those who never experience a eureka
moment shows a pronounced U-shape by age; in contrast, the plot of those
who implement the optimal strategy immediately has a pronounced inverted
U-shape. Plots for eureka moments in the interior of the time space (that is,
those that occur strictly after the ﬁrst month) are ﬂat.
13 The “No eureka” line
implies that the groups with the greatest frequency of maximal confusion
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12. We thank Robert Barro of Harvard University for drawing our attention to this type of
potentially tricky ﬁnancial product. We also note that changes in regulation proposed in May
2008 by the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Ofﬁce of
Thrift Supervision would forbid banks from applying payments solely to transferred balances.
13. Although the average share of borrowers in each of the intermediate categories is
small—on the order of 5 percent—summing over all the months yields a fraction of borrow-
ers equal to one-third of the total.
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a. Fraction experiencing eureka moment in each of months 3 through 6 is below 10 percent for all ages.
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11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 65are younger adults and older adults. The group most likely to adopt the
optimal strategy immediately is adults aged 35–44.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 6 plots the ﬁtted values of the age splines for
the propensity ever to experience a eureka moment. Note that unlike in the
other ﬁgures, higher values here indicate a smaller propensity to make mis-
takes. Consistent with the evidence so far, a performance peak occurs in
middle age.
14 In section III.C we discuss possible explanations for this and
the other age-related differences we observe.
15
HOME EQUITY LOANS AND LINES OF CREDIT. Figure 7 plots the ﬁtted values
on the splines for age for interest rates paid on home equity loans and lines
of credit. The lines have a pronounced U-shape: the relatively young and
the relatively old face APRs that can be 50 basis points or more higher than
what the middle-aged pay.
For these two examples, we believe we understand the mechanism lead-
ing to the differences by age: misestimation of the value of one’s home.
The amount of collateral offered by the borrower, as measured by the loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio, is an important determinant of loan APRs. Higher
LTV ratios imply higher APRs, since the fraction of collateral is lower.
At the financial institution that provided our data, borrowers first esti-
mate their home’s value and then apply for a loan or credit line falling into
one of three categories depending on the implied LTV estimate: 80 per-
cent or less, between 80 and 90 percent, and 90 percent or greater. The
financial institution then independently verifies the home’s value using
an industry-standard methodology and constructs its own LTV measure,
which can therefore differ from the borrower’s.
16
The pricing of the loan or credit line depends on the LTV category that
the borrower falls into, and not on where precisely the LTV falls within
that category.
17 If the borrower has overestimated the value of the home,
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14. We also check for the possibilities that the relatively old and the relatively young
might have lower levels of debt or less access to credit than the middle-aged. We ﬁnd that
neither credit card debt nor the number of open credit cards varies in economically or statis-
tically signiﬁcant ways with age.
15. The online appendix presents a formal hypothesis test for the U-shaped curves; we
reject the null hypothesis of a ﬂat age-based pattern in 9 out of the 10 cases.
16. Agarwal (2007) provides evidence that younger households are more likely to over-
state, and older households to understate, their home’s value. Bucks and Pence (2006) present
evidence that many borrowers do not accurately estimate their home’s value.
17. We have veriﬁed this practice in our dataset by regressing the APR on both the
bank’s estimated LTV and dummy variables for whether the bank’s LTV falls into one of
the three categories. Only the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables were statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant. Ben-David (2008) also shows that there are discrete jumps in lending
rates at LTV cutoff points.
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18. Even if the ﬁnancial institution’s estimate of the true home value is inaccurate, that
misestimation will not matter for the borrower as long as other institutions use the same
methodology.
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so that the financial institution’s LTV is higher than the borrower’s, the
institution will direct the buyer to a different loan with a higher interest
rate corresponding to the higher LTV. In such circumstances the loan
officer is also given some discretion to depart from the ﬁnancial institu-
tion’s normal pricing schedule to offer a higher interest rate than the ofﬁcer
would have offered to a borrower who had correctly estimated her LTV. If
the borrower has underestimated the home’s value, however, the ﬁnancial
institution need not direct the buyer to a loan with a lower interest rate
corresponding to the ﬁnancial institution’s lower LTV estimate; the loan
ofﬁcer may simply choose to offer the higher interest rate associated with
the borrower’s estimate.
18
Since the APR paid depends on the LTV category and not on the LTV
itself, home value misestimation leads to higher interest rate payments
only if the financial institution’s estimated LTV falls in a different cate-
gory than the borrower’s. If, in contrast, the borrower’s estimated LTV
was, say, 60 percent, but the ﬁnancial institution’s estimate was 70 per-
cent, the borrower would still qualify for the highest-quality loan category
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We define a rate-changing mistake (RCM) to have occurred when the
borrower’s LTV falls in a different category from the ﬁnancial institution’s,
for instance when the borrower estimates an LTV of 85 but the ﬁnancial
institution calculates an LTV of 75 percent (or vice versa). We ﬁnd that, on
average, making an RCM increases the APR by 125 basis points for loans and
150 basis points for credit lines (controlling for other variables, but not age).
To examine the importance of RCMs, we ﬁrst study the APRs offered to
consumers who do not make an RCM. The top panel of ﬁgure 8 plots the
ﬁtted values from reestimating the regressions of APRs on borrower char-
acteristics and age splines, but now conditioning on borrowers who do not
make an RCM. The plots show only slight differences in APR paid by age.
For home equity loans, the difference in APR between a borrower at age 70
and a borrower at age 50 has shrunk from 36 basis points to 8 basis points;
for home equity lines of credit, it has shrunk from 28 basis points to 4 basis
points. For a borrower at age 20, the APR difference over a borrower at
age 50 has shrunk to 3 basis points for both loans and lines of credit. We
conclude that among borrowers who do not make an RCM, the APR is
essentially flat with age. Therefore, the U-shape of the APR age curve is
primarily driven by RCMs.
We next investigate who makes RCMs. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 8 plots
the propensity to make an RCM by age for home equity loans and credit
lines. The figure shows U-shapes for both. Borrowers at age 70 have a
16-percentage-point greater chance of making a mistake on a home equity
loan than borrowers at age 50 (the difference for lines of credit is 19 per-
centage points); the comparable numbers for borrowers at age 20 relative to
age 50 are 35 and 41 percentage points. The unconditional average probabil-
ity of making an RCM is 24 percent for loans and 18 percent for credit lines.
This age effect is consistent with the cost of an RCM calculated above
and the additional probability of making an RCM with age. For example,
as noted, a 70-year-old has a 16-percentage-point additional chance of
making an RCM on a home equity loan. Multiplying this by the average
APR cost of an RCM for home equity loans of about 125 basis points gives
an expected incremental APR paid of about 26 points. The analogous dif-
ference for lines of credit is 23 basis points. These differences are very
close to the estimated differences of about 23 and 28 basis points.
We conclude that in this example we have identified the reason for
the U-shape of home equity APRs as a function of age (as always, control-
ling for other characteristics). Younger and older consumers have a greater
tendency to misestimate the value of their home, which leads them to make
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Figure 8. Rate-Changing Mistakes in Home Equity Loan and Line of Credit Applications
























a. A rate-changing mistake (RCM) occurs when the borrower’s estimate of the value of the home 
differs from the lender’s estimate by enough to place the borrower’s implied loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 
in a different interest rate category from the lender’s implied LTV. The categories are LTV ≤ 80 percent, 
80 percent < LTV< 90 percent, and LTV ≥ 90 percent; loans in higher LTV categories may be charged 
higher interest rates.
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11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 69an RCM, which in turn results in their borrowing at a higher APR than
they could have obtained. On the other hand, for consumers who do not
make an RCM, the APR is essentially independent of age.
Given the large costs associated with an RCM, one might ask why bor-
rowers do not make a greater effort to accurately estimate the value of their
home. One possibility is that potential borrowers are not aware that credit
terms will differ by LTV category or, if they are aware of this fact, they may
not know by how much the terms differ. This feature of loan pricing may
thus be a shrouded attribute, in the sense of Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
III.B. Seven Other Financial Choices
In this section we present results on the seven other credit prices we
studied: interest rates on personal credit cards, auto loans, mortgages, and
small business credit cards (figure 9), and three types of credit card fees
(late payment, overlimit, and cash advance; ﬁgure 10). In all seven cases,
plots of ﬁtted values on the coefﬁcients on the age splines are U-shaped by
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
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sions we have tried to control for other variables that might explain dif-
ferences in the cost of suboptimal financial choices by age. Data and
regression results are presented in the online appendix.
Visual inspection of the age splines in all cases suggests that fees and
interest rates paid are lowest for customers in their late 40s or early 50s. To
estimate the minimum more precisely, we reestimate each model, replac-
ing the splines from age 40 to 50 and from age 50 to 60 with a single spline
running from age 40 to 60 and the square of that spline. Table 2 reports our
estimates of the “age of reason,” the point in the life span at which ﬁnan-
cial mistakes are minimized, for each type of transaction. The mean age of
reason in these estimates is 53.3 years, and the standard deviation calcu-
lated by treating each study as a single data point is 4.3 years.
The lowest age of peak performance is that for the eureka moment task.
Interestingly, that task is arguably the most dependent on analytical capac-
ity and the least dependent on experience, since the kinds of balance trans-
fer offers that we study were new ﬁnancial products when our data were
collected. Hence, it is not surprising that the peak age for succeeding at that
task would be earlier than for the other tasks. However, since we lack a rig-
orous measure of the difﬁculty of a task, the interpretation of the eureka
case remains speculative.
AGARWAL, DRISCOLL, GABAIX, and LAIBSON 71














60 70 50 40 30
Overlimit fee
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 71It would be useful to measure such effects in other decision domains,
such as savings choices, asset allocation choices beyond stocks, and health
care choices. We have described a simple procedure for doing this: ﬁrst
identify the general shape of the age effect, as in equation 1, using controls
and age splines, and then estimate a linear-quadratic equation to localize the
peak of performance. George Korniotis and Alok Kumar (forthcoming-a)
conﬁrm our U-shape hypothesis in their study of investment skills.
It may also be possible to develop models that predict the age of peak
performance. There is a growing consensus that analytically intensive prob-
lems, like those in mathematics, are associated with younger peak ages
(see Simonton 1988; Galenson 2006; Weinberg and Galenson 2005). Anal-
ogously, problems that require more experiential training have older peak
ages. For instance, Benjamin Jones (2005) ﬁnds that the peak age for nat-
ural scientists drifted higher over the 20th century. Relative to 100 years
ago, more experience now needs to be accumulated to reach the cutting
edge of scientiﬁc ﬁelds. In this paper we found that what is arguably the
most analytically demanding task—deducing the best way to exploit low-
interest balance transfers—is associated with the youngest age of peak per-
formance. It would be useful to study the association between analytically
demanding problems and peak age.
III.C. Possible Explanations
Each credit market has idiosyncratic factors that may contribute to the
hump-shaped age patterns that we have measured. But the recurrence of
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Table 2. Age of Peak Performance for 10 Financial Tasks
Age
Task Mean Standard deviation
Minimizing APR on:
Home equity loans 55.9 4.2
Home equity lines 53.3 5.2
Credit cards 50.3 6.0
Automobile loans 49.6 5.0
Mortgages 56.0 8.0
Small business credit cards 61.8 7.9
Experiencing eureka moment 45.8 7.9
Avoiding credit card late fees 51.9 4.9
Avoiding credit card overlimit fees 54.0 5.0
Avoiding credit card cash advance fees 54.8 4.9
Average 53.3 4.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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some common underlying explanation. In this section we discuss sev-
eral such possible explanations, including cognitive age effects, selec-
tion effects, and cohort effects. We do not ﬁnd evidence for selection or
cohort effects that could explain our results, but our data do not allow us to
deﬁnitively rule them out.
AGE-RELATED EFFECTS. One possible explanation for the U-shaped pattern
of mistakes is a combination of two age-based effects: diminishing returns
to learning, and the age-based decline in analytical function we documented
in section I. Relatively young borrowers tend to have low levels of experi-
ence but a high degree of analytical function, whereas older borrowers tend
to have high levels of experience but relatively lower analytical function. We
discussed these mechanisms in section I and explained how these offsetting
trends could produce a hump-shaped pattern in ﬁnancial sophistication.
This hypothesis of two offsetting age-based effects also provides a pos-
sible explanation of the location of peak performance. We hypothesize that
peak performance reﬂects a trade-off between rising experience and declin-
ing analytical function. If so, the sooner people start experimenting with a
ﬁnancial product, the earlier the peak of performance should be. To evalu-
ate this hypothesis for each ﬁnancial product, we ﬁrst construct the age dis-
tribution of the users of this product in our dataset and calculate the age at
the 10th percentile of the distribution, which we call “age10%.” This is a
proxy for the age at which people typically start using the product. We then
regress the location of peak performance on that variable, with the follow-
ing results:
The adjusted R
2 for the equation is 0.62, and the standard errors on the inter-
cept and the coefﬁcient are, respectively, 5.7 and 0.19.
19 Thus, we reject
the null hypothesis of no relationship between the peak variable and age10%.
Products whose use begins later in life tend to have a later performance
peak.
SELECTION EFFECTS. The cross-sectional age effects that we measure are
probably also partly attributable to differences in the pool of borrowers
by age group—a selection effect. For example, in the total population of
U.S. households, retirees borrow less than other adults, as the life-cycle
peak age =+ × 33 0 71 10 .. %
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19. The effect is robust to the choice of percentiles other than the 10th for the start vari-
able. For instance, the correlation between peak age and median age of users for the product
is 0.83.
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fore be unrepresentative of the population of all older adults. Likewise,
older adults who are borrowing might be less ﬁnancially savvy than 30- or
50-year-old borrowers, since borrowing might be less of a bad signal at
these younger ages.
20 Below we describe several ways of measuring the
role of sample selection in determining our results.
Lack of ﬁnancial sophistication in relatively older (or younger) borrow-
ers should be reﬂected in those borrowers having less education, income,
or net worth than nonborrowers of the same age. To make such compar-
isons, we calculate for each age group the ratio of the median educational
attainment (or income, or net worth) of borrowers in that group to the
median for all members of the group. We want to determine whether these
ratios differ across age groups. In other words, are borrowers differentially
selected across different age groups? Since our proprietary dataset con-
tains information only on borrowers, we cannot use it to make these calcu-
lations. However, we can make such comparisons using the SCF.
Using data from the 1989, 1998, 2001, and 2004 SCFs, we compute the
above ratios for education, income, and net worth; results are presented in
the online appendix. We ﬁnd that within age groups, borrowers almost
always have higher income and more education than the population as a
whole, and often have higher net worth. Moreover, older borrowers appear
to have relatively higher income and more education relative to their peers
than middle-aged borrowers do. Hence, these data suggest that the selec-
tion effects by age go in the opposite direction from that predicted: older
borrowers appear to be a more affluent and better educated pool than
middle-aged borrowers. We present additional results in the online appen-
dix showing that borrowing by age does not appear to vary by race, and that
older borrowers do not appear to have disproportionately lower incomes,
lower FICO (credit) scores, or more debt than older people generally.
None of these analyses lend support to the idea that sample selection
effects contribute to the U-shaped patterns that we see in the data. If in fact
a higher proportion of older borrowers are unsophisticated, then that lack
of sophistication is somehow evident only in borrowing rates and fee
payments, and not in credit scores, default rates, educational attainment,
income, or net worth. Although we concede that this is a logical possibil-
ity, we know of no explanation for why such a lack of sophistication would
appear so selectively in the data.
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20. They could also be riskier, in ways not captured by the risk measures we include—a
hypothesis that we consider (and reject) below.
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tively less sophisticated ﬁnancial choices than younger borrowers because
they belong to cohorts that have less human capital than younger cohorts
(see, for example, Flynn 1984). For example, older cohorts may be less
mathematically literate than younger cohorts, or they may use less sophis-
ticated search technologies: for instance, they may be less inclined to use
the Internet to compare ﬁnancial products. Finally, older cohorts may have
grown up with different ﬁnancial products than those now available.
Without a true panel dataset with information going back 20 years or
more, we cannot measure the role of cohort effects in explaining the
observed U-shaped pattern relative to other explanations. However, several
facts make us think that cohort effects cannot be the whole explanation.
First, education-based cohort effects cannot explain the pattern of declin-
ing mistakes that we observe over the ﬁrst half of adulthood. Second, we
observe the U-shaped pattern over a broad range of products, some of
which, such as mortgages, have seen substantial changes in their institu-
tional characteristics over time, while others, such as auto loans, have not.
Third, if cohort effects were important, one would expect to see differ-
ences in prices paid between male and female borrowers, on the grounds
that the current cohort of older female borrowers have tended to be less
involved in ﬁnancial decisionmaking than their male contemporaries. In
fact, we ﬁnd no substantive differences between men and women. Finally,
for two products—auto loans and credit cards—we have data from 1992,
10 years earlier than the data used for our other studies. Replicating our
analysis for these data results in the same U-shaped pattern.
In summary, although cohort effects are probably present in our data, we
doubt that they play an important role in explaining the U-shaped pattern.
Cohort effects are most likely to make some contribution to the decline in
performance that we measure after middle age. The improvement in per-
formance up to middle age is harder to explain with cohort stories, although
some preference-based cohort effect might be generating this pattern.
21
RISK EFFECTS. Some of our results could be driven by unobserved varia-
tion in default risk that is not reﬂected in the risk measures (such as FICO
scores) that we use as control variables. For instance, the U-shaped pattern
of APRs could be due to a similar pattern of default by age. We test this
alternative hypothesis by analyzing default rates on credit cards, auto loans,
and home equity loans and credit lines. We estimate a linear regression in
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21. See Malmendier and Nagel (2007) for examples of how cohort effects affect prefer-
ences for equities.
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income, and all of the standard risk measures that are in our data. When we
plot ﬁtted values by age (see the online appendix for the chart), we ﬁnd a
pronounced  inverted U-shape for home equity loans and credit lines,
implying that the young and the old have lower default rates than the
middle-aged. Credit cards and auto loans show a slightly inverted U-shape,
and the curve for small business credit cards is about flat. Hence, these
results contradict the hypothesis that our APR results are driven by an
unmeasured default risk. Finally, note that age-dependent default risks
would not explain the observed patterns in credit card fee payments or in
the suboptimal use of credit card balance transfers.
OPPORTUNITY COST OF TIME. Some age effects could be generated by
age-related variation in the opportunity cost of time (Aguiar and Hurst
2007). However, standard opportunity cost effects would predict that
retirees pay lower prices, which is not what we observe in our data. Never-
theless, our ﬁndings and those of Aguiar and Hurst are not necessarily con-
tradictory. Shopping for a familiar commodity—for instance, a gallon of
milk—is much less analytically demanding than shopping for a compli-
cated and somewhat unfamiliar product that can differ across many dimen-
sions, such as a mortgage. Hence, we are not surprised to see older adults
shopping more effectively for food even while losing ground in relatively
more complex domains. In addition, shopping at stores and supermarkets
may be a more pleasant activity than shopping at banks and other lenders,
leading consumers to devote more time to the former.
The 2007 SCF provides some support for the idea that shopping intensity
for loans decreases with age. That survey asked borrowers whether, when
borrowing money or obtaining credit, they shop around a great deal, moder-
ately, or not at all. For borrowers under age 35, 24 percent report shopping
around a great deal, 60 percent moderately, and 15 percent almost no shop-
ping. The corresponding ﬁgures for those aged 75 and over are 15 percent,
40 percent, and 46 percent. The online appendix presents a full table of
results by SCF age class as well as the text of the survey question.
DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER SUPPLY FACTORS. The presence of age effects
might also be interpreted as evidence for some kind of age discrimina-
tion. Banks may explicitly choose to charge older and younger borrowers
higher APRs, or they may simply market products that happen to have
higher APRs or fees more aggressively to the young or the old. We believe
these explanations to be unlikely for two reasons. First, the U-shaped pat-
tern shows up in contexts, such as credit card fee payments and failures to
optimally use balance transfer offers, in which discrimination is not rele-
76 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 76AGARWAL, DRISCOLL, GABAIX, and LAIBSON 77
22. Charles, Hurst, and Stephens (2008) document racial differences in lending rates at
auto ﬁnance companies, but not at banks.
Table 3. Differences in the Cost of Selected Financial Products by Age
Interest rate or   Total cost difference
probability difference   relative to age 50
b
relative to age 50a (dollars a year)
Product or task At age 25 At age 75 At age 25 At age 75
Difference in APR 
Product (basis points)
Home equity loan 73 40 284 146
Home equity line of credit 68 51 296 265
Auto loan 20 12 8 4
Mortgage 6 15 25 62
Personal credit card 17 5 2 1
Small business credit card 26 14 3 2
Difference in probability 
of experiencing 
Task (percentage points)
Eureka moment 8 11 37 13
Avoiding credit card late fees 2 2 8 8
Avoiding credit card overlimit fees 1 1 4 4
Avoiding credit card cash advance fees 2 1 8 4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. For the six products, difference between the APR paid by a borrower of the indicated age and that of
a 50-year-old borrower. For the four tasks, difference between the probability that a borrower of the indi-
cated age will succeed at the task and the same probability that a 50-year-old will.
b. For the six products, the difference in APRs times the average debt level by age (see the online
appendix). For the eureka moment, the difference in probability times the APR difference for personal
credit cards times the balance transferred. For the credit card fees, the difference in probability times $35
(the typical fee amount) times 12 months. This may understate the true cost difference because multiple
fee payments may trigger a rise in the interest rate on cash advance balances.
vant, since the products are the same and all cardholders face the same
rules. Second, ﬁrms are likely to avoid age discrimination for legal reasons
or to avoid the costs of negative publicity.
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III.D. How Large Are the Effects?
The effects we ﬁnd have a wide range of dollar magnitudes, as reported
in table 3. We estimate that for home equity lines of credit, 75-year-olds
pay about $265 more a year, and 25-year-olds about $296 more, than
50-year-olds. For other quantities, such as credit card fees, the implied
age differentials are small: up to $10 a year for each kind of fee. The
importance of these effects goes beyond the economic significance of
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 77each individual case, however: the consistent appearance of a U-shaped
pattern of costs in such a wide variety of circumstances points to a phe-
nomenon that might also apply to many other areas.
23 An important ques-
tion is whether this pattern translates into other choice domains, including
saving, asset allocation, and health care.
Indeed, in domains for which we lack data, the effects might be larger.
For instance, our sample probably does not contain older adults with
severe dementia, for which the effects might be stronger. In section VI we
estimate the fraction of GDP that may be wasted because of poor ﬁnancial
decisionmaking.
IV. Other Work on Economic Decisionmaking 
over the Life Cycle
Our analysis is part of a recent literature that studies the effects of aging
and cognitive function on the use of ﬁnancial instruments (see, for exam-
ple, Willis 2007; McArdle and others forthcoming), which in turn is part of
a broader literature on household ﬁnance (Campbell 2006). In their work
on ﬁnancial literacy, Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell (2006, 2007)
ﬁnd declines in the mastery of basic ﬁnancial concepts, such as the ability
to calculate percentages or perform simple division, in adults after age 50.
In light of our ﬁndings, other researchers have offered to look for age
patterns of ﬁnancial mistakes in their own datasets. Lucia Dunn (personal
communication, June 2007) has reported to us that the Ohio State Survey on
credit cards shows a U-shaped pattern of credit card APR terms by age.
Fiona Scott Morton (personal communication, May 2007) has reported that
in her dataset of indirect auto loans (loans made by banks and ﬁnance com-
panies using the dealer as an intermediary; see Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer,
and Silva-Risso 2003), loan markups show a U-shaped age pattern. Luigi
Guiso (personal communication, April 2007) ﬁnds that when picking
stocks, consumers achieve their best Sharpe ratios at about age 43, and this
effect appears to be entirely driven by the willingness to hold stocks in the
ﬁrst place. Ernesto Villanueva (personal communication, April 2007) ﬁnds
that mortgage APRs in Spanish survey data (comparable to the U.S. Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances) follow a U-shaped curve by age.
A relationship between age and performance has been noted in many
nonﬁnancial contexts. Survey data suggest that labor earnings peak around
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23. For example, Korniotis and Kumar (2008a) conﬁrm our U-shape hypothesis in their
study of investment skills.
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rience (Murphy and Welch 1990). Kelly Shue and Erzo Luttmer (2009) ﬁnd
that older and younger voters make disproportionately more errors in voting
than do middle-aged voters. John Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Manju
Puri (2008) ﬁnd that older CEOs tend to be more risk averse (see Simonton
1988 for a survey).
A recent literature reports systematic differences in rationality between
groups of people, particularly with respect to ﬁnancial decisionmaking.
Barry Scholnick, Nadia Massoud, and Anthony Saunders (2008) ﬁnd that
wealthier people make fewer mistakes on their credit cards, and Agarwal
and others (2008) reach a similar conclusion concerning more experienced
people. Victor Stango and Jonathan Zinman (2009) document that naive
consumers substantially underestimate loan interest rates when asked to
infer them from principal, maturity, and monthly payments. Korniotis and
Kumar (2008) ﬁnd that investors who perform better on standard intelli-
gence tests obtain better risk-adjusted returns (see also Korniotis and Kumar
forthcoming-b). In experimental contexts, Shane Frederick (2005) identiﬁes
a measure of IQ: people with higher scores on cognitive ability tasks tend to
exhibit fewer and weaker psychological biases. Daniel Benjamin, Sebastian
Brown, and Jesse Shapiro (2006) ﬁnd that subjects with higher intelligence
test scores, or less cognitive load, display fewer behavioral biases.
Several researchers have looked at the response of consumers to credit
card teaser rates. Haiyan Shui and Lawrence Ausubel (2005) show that con-
sumers prefer credit card contracts with low initial rates for a short period
to ones with somewhat higher rates for a longer period, even when the latter
are ex post more beneﬁcial. Consumers also appear reluctant to switch con-
tracts even when they would beneﬁt from doing so (Agarwal and others
2006). Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier (2004) theorize that
financial institutions set the terms of credit card contracts to reflect con-
sumers’ poor forecasting ability over their future consumption. Many of
these effects are discussed in the literature on behavioral industrial organi-
zation, which documents and studies markets with boundedly rational con-
sumers and rational ﬁrms.
24 In some of that literature, the effects depend
on having both naive and sophisticated consumers in the market. The
present paper suggests that those naive consumers will disproportionately
be younger and older adults.
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24. Examples from this literature include DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gabaix
and Laibson (2006), Heidhues and Ko ˝szegi (2009), Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007),
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), and Spiegler (2006).
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In this section we discuss nine mutually compatible policy responses (and
some hybrids) to the problems we have identiﬁed, both speciﬁcally with
respect to older adults and more generally with respect to their applicabil-
ity to ﬁnancial decisionmakers of all ages. We analyze the pros and cons of
each approach without arguing for the adoption of any one of them, recog-
nizing that strong regulatory interventions have the potential to generate
large social beneﬁts but also large social costs. The nine approaches are
discussed approximately in order from least to most paternalistic. This order-
ing is somewhat arbitrary since some approaches have multiple dimensions,
some of which might be more or less paternalistic than others.
V.A. Laissez-Faire
Laissez-faire is surely not the ﬁrst-best policy. As we have noted, about
half of decisionmakers between ages 80 and 89 are significantly cogni-
tively impaired. The competitive equilibrium is unlikely to be efficient
when agents routinely make signiﬁcant cognitive errors.
A growing body of anecdotal evidence finds that overpriced financial
products are being targeted at older adults (for example, Choi-Allum 2009).
The competitive equilibrium works as follows: Some older adults will make
bad decisions (for example, overpaying for ﬁnancial services or losing their
money in fraudulent schemes), generating economic rents for those who
can exploit these decisions. These rents are partially dissipated, however,
because the aggressive or manipulative sales tactics needed to capture them
are costly, and because fraudulent sellers face the risk of legal punishment.
In equilibrium, the zero-economic-profit condition still applies, but the
social allocation is inefficient. To put it more intuitively, when sellers
must spend a dollar of their own resources (their time, legal defense fees,
and so forth) to convince a pool of older adults to give them a dollar in
rent, excess proﬁts will be zero, but there is a social deadweight loss of one
dollar. In equilibrium, then, wasteful marketing and bad products will
survive even if competition eliminates all excess profits. (See Gabaix
and Laibson 2006 for a related argument.)
Laissez-faire policies are nevertheless serious candidates on our list of
optimal policies, because the laissez-faire approach could be second-best
optimal. Strong regulatory interventions are problematic for many familiar
reasons. Regulations are usually administratively costly. They may harm
the interests of households who are ﬁnancially sophisticated or who have
sophisticated and trustworthy advisers. Policymakers may have conﬂicts
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these reasons, we do not rule out laissez-faire policies. In addition, laissez-
faire policies are compatible with voluntary advance directives (discussed
below), in which rational household members, recognizing the possibility
of their own future cognitive decline, set up protective mechanisms ahead
of time, in the form of family oversight, competent and trustworthy ﬁnan-
cial advisers, and formal trusts.
However, such delegation-based solutions are limited by seven factors:
the failure to anticipate, when cognitively healthy, the possibility of one’s
own future cognitive decline; the mistaken belief that one will recognize
one’s own cognitive decline and respond optimally by progressively del-
egating decisionmaking as it occurs; procrastination; the difficulties that
external parties face in determining when key thresholds of cognitive
decline have been crossed, so that control can be transferred efﬁciently;
administrative costs, particularly when the trustee is a third party such as
an attorney; a lack of ﬁnancially sophisticated family members, capable of
making good ﬁnancial decisions on the declining adult’s behalf; and a lack
of trustworthy family members.
The last of these is particularly important, since, counterintuitively, fam-
ily members are often a poor choice to play an oversight role. Of course,
altruism is strong in many families, and many family members do have
intimate knowledge of each other’s preferences. However, family mem-
bers also face a conﬂict of interest when they are residual claimants on a
parent’s estate. Hence, many older adults will lack an unconﬂicted, low-
cost agent to whom they can safely delegate decisionmaking authority.
V.B. Disclosure
Full and fair disclosure has been the primary goal of ﬁnancial regulatory
systems since the 19th century, and it is at the heart of many current con-
gressional proposals. Legislation to strengthen disclosure requirements
has recently been introduced in many different domains, including mutual
fund fees, 401(k) fees, and mortgage origination fees.
However, we are skeptical that improved disclosure will be effective
in improving financial choices. Even for cognitively healthy popula-
tions, there is scant evidence that increases in disclosure improve decision-
making. In a series of recent studies of middle-aged adults, additional
disclosure and consumer education made surprisingly little difference. In
one study, employees with low saving rates were randomly assigned to a
treatment in which they were paid $50 to read a short survey explaining
their 401(k) plan, including a calculation of how much money they would
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to a control group, this group did not significantly increase its average
401(k) saving rate (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2007). The bankruptcy of
the Houston-based Enron Corporation and the huge losses suffered by
many of its employees who had invested their 401(k)s largely in Enron
stock had no effect, despite intense media coverage, on the willingness of
newly hired workers at other ﬁrms to invest their 401(k) contributions in
employer stock. This was true even for newly hired workers at other ﬁrms
in Houston (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2005). Employer-sponsored
financial education seminars have been shown to have little effect on
401(k) enrollment (Madrian and Shea 2001b). A new, easy-to-read sum-
mary prospectus proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) seems to have no effect on investor choices (Beshears and others
2009a). Finally, making mutual fund fees overwhelmingly salient does
not lead investors to minimize them, even when allocating real money
among index funds. In one study, subjects were asked to allocate $10,000
among four S&P 500 index funds. To help with their choice, the sub-
jects were told what an index fund is, given a one-page summary sheet
comparing the fees of the four index funds, and given the prospectus of
each fund. Only 10 percent of the subjects put all $10,000 in the fund
with the lowest costs (Choi and others 2007).
The subjects of these studies were all adults in the workforce. It is likely
that disclosure would be even less effective on retired older adults experi-
encing signiﬁcant declines in cognitive function.
We wish to emphasize that we are not opposed to disclosure. There is no
evidence that it hurts, and it is certainly possible that it makes a small posi-
tive difference. For example, the study using the SEC summary prospectus
found that shortening and simplifying mutual fund prospectuses would save
paper and printing costs and decision time, even if it had no effect on asset
allocation. So when improved disclosure is itself inexpensive or reduces
other costs, it is surely a good idea. But one should not expect disclosure to
resolve the regulatory concerns raised by the ﬁndings in this paper.
V.C. Libertarian Paternalism: Advice, Defaults, and Other Nudges
In the last decade a growing body of research has suggested that gentle
institutional “nudges” can improve behavior without mandating any par-
ticular behavior. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2003, 2008) refer to
such interventions as “libertarian paternalism,” because the social planner
is acting paternalistically by nudging behavior in one direction, but simul-
taneously maintaining a libertarian stance by allowing the actor to reject
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matic 401(k) enrollment with an opt-out feature (Madrian and Shea 2001a;
Choi and others 2002) and automatic saving rate escalators (Thaler and
Benartzi 2004).
In practice, such nudges work when the nudge is aligned with the inten-
tions of the person being nudged, for example when employees want to be
enrolled in their company’s 401(k) plan but for whatever reason fail to
enroll on their own. But nudges are rejected when the nudge is misaligned
with those intentions. For example, when workers are automatically
enrolled at a saving rate that they deem too high (say, 12 percent of
income), almost all opt out (Beshears and others 2009b). Likewise, auto-
matic annuitization of defined-benefit accumulations is often rejected in
favor of lump-sum payouts (Mottola and Utkus 2007).
It is also important that those being nudged not be subject to forceful
opposing inﬂuences. In the case of automatic 401(k) enrollment, workers
overwhelmingly perceive that they save too little (Choi and others 2002),
and no third party stands to gain a signiﬁcant rent by convincing them not
to enroll. In other words, no third party has a strong incentive to nudge in
the other direction.
Unfortunately, benevolent institutional nudges, whether by the gov-
ernment or by other agents, will probably provide little protection for
older adults. These benevolent nudges will often be outweighed by malevo-
lent ones emanating from marketers and unscrupulous relatives (see Choi-
Allum 2009). Older adults with low ﬁnancial literacy or signiﬁcant cognitive
impairment may be no match for highly incentivized parties with malevo-
lent interests and ample opportunities to nudge in the wrong direction.
Here, too, we are not opposed to the intervention in principle. Nudges
can partly protect older adults and other vulnerable economic agents. How-
ever, we suspect that nudges will only be weakly protective in an environ-
ment where older adults are soft (and increasingly wealthy) targets for those
with conﬂicts of interest.
V.D. Financial “Driver’s Licenses”
Another set of proposals would require that individuals pass a “license”
test before being allowed to make nontrivial ﬁnancial decisions, such as
opting out of “safe harbor” investment products (Alesina and Lusardi
2006; see section V.G below). Such proposals would need to overcome
several logistical problems. Can a test be devised that reliably separates
qualiﬁed from unqualiﬁed investors, without generating too many false
negatives or false positives? Can it be administered at a reasonable social
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coaching by parties with conﬂicts of interest? Who would be required to
take the test? How often would retesting be required? Would it be required
often enough to catch people as they transition (often very quickly) into a
state of signiﬁcant cognitive impairment? Would such a test be politically
feasible if it primarily targeted older adults?
V.E. Strengthening Fiduciary Responsibilities
Regulators could also increase the ﬁduciary duties of individuals who
sell ﬁnancial products. In the extreme, all sales of ﬁnancial products to
individuals could be required to be conducted by an agent with a ﬁduciary
duty toward the buyer.
The word “ﬁduciary” originates from the Latin words ﬁdes and ﬁducia,
which mean, respectively, “faith” and “trust.” Under common law, ﬁducia-
ries are legally bound to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest
of a beneﬁciary—the principal—and to avoid conﬂicts of interest and self-
dealing. Because of these legal obligations, the principal can trust the
fiduciary to do the right thing. In an influential decision, Judge Benjamin
Cardozo wrote that a ﬁduciary “is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”
25
In the United States, many types of advisers—lawyers, guardians, execu-
tors, trustees, conservators of estates, corporate directors, corporate ofﬁcers,
and majority shareholders—bear ﬁduciary duties. Investment advisers also
have a fiduciary duty, which is legislated in the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940. As we mentioned in the introduction, the Employee Retirement
Investment Savings Act (ERISA) imposes a ﬁduciary duty on employers
that sponsor retirement plans, for their decisions that affect plan partici-
pants, who in turn have the right to sue over breaches of that duty.
However, many types of ﬁnancial representatives and salespeople have
no legal ﬁduciary responsibilities, and a substantial fraction of ﬁnancial
services are sold by such agents. For example, an annuity salesperson who
cold-calls potential clients may legally receive large commissions (which
are often shrouded from the client) for selling them ﬁnancial products with
large markups. Neither these agents nor the registered representatives of
securities broker-dealer firms are considered investment advisers, and
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they overwhelmingly fail to do so.
27. Alternatively, this could be a springing power of attorney, which takes effect only in
the event of their incapacity.
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consequently they do not have a full ﬁduciary duty. Brokers’ duties are
established in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which does not set a
ﬁduciary standard.
One implication is that many workers have much greater effective regu-
latory protection than retirees. Employer 401(k) plans and other deﬁned-
contribution plans are regulated by ERISA, which, as noted, imposes a
strong ﬁduciary duty on the employer. IRAs, in contrast, have a much lower
level of protection, since the representatives of the securities broker-dealer
firms that manage these accounts are not full-fledged fiduciaries. Thus,
when a retiree rolls money over from her 401(k) account to an IRA, as hap-
pens with the overwhelming majority of 401(k) assets, her savings lose the
ﬁduciary protection she enjoyed as an employee. Of course, nobody forces
retirees to make these rollovers, but the ﬁnancial services industry has a
strong incentive to encourage them, since fees are higher in practice out-
side of 401(k) accounts.
26
Mandating ﬁduciary responsibilities, even weak ones, on the sellers of
ﬁnancial services would give them a stronger incentive to design and mar-
ket products that meet high standards. But it might also generate new
administrative and compliance costs and slow ﬁnancial innovation. If these
inefﬁciencies were to prove considerable, an alternative would be to man-
date ﬁduciary duties only in certain circumstances, for example when the
buyer is above some age threshold. Other intermediate solutions would be
to impose on IRA asset managers the same ﬁduciary duties as 401(k) plan
sponsors, or to strongly discourage rollovers from 401(k)s to IRAs.
V.F. Mandatory Advance Directives
One way to address directly the impact of cognitive decline on finan-
cial decisionmaking would be to require older adults to put in place a
ﬁnancial advance directive before reaching a certain age. Such mandatory
advance directives could take many forms. For instance, older adults might
be required to create a durable power of attorney, so that somebody would
be able to manage their financial affairs in the event of their incapacity.
27
Alternatively, older adults might be required to create a streamlined 
version of a revocable living trust. Such trusts enable individuals to pass
management of their assets to a fiduciary in the event of the principal’s
incapacity.
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 85Entirely new legal protections might also be created. For example, a
fiduciary could be appointed to approve all “significant financial trans-
actions” involving the principal’s funds after the principal reaches a des-
ignated age. A significant financial transaction might be defined as any
transaction representing more than a certain share (which could decrease
with the principal’s age) of the principal’s net worth. The principal would
preset this threshold for ﬁduciary approval at the time the advance directive
is created. To make the process easier, a default schedule could be estab-
lished, for example, beginning at 50 percent of net worth at age 75 and
falling as the principal ages. If a seller then enters into a ﬁnancial transac-
tion with the principal without formal approval from the principal’s ﬁdu-
ciary, and it is subsequently determined that the transaction exceeded the
relevant threshold, the transaction could be nulliﬁed. In addition, the direc-
tive would stipulate who will judge the principal’s mental capacity and
how the principal’s assets would be administered in the event the principal
is judged no longer mentally competent. Finally, the details of the directive
(including the choice of ﬁduciary) could be changed at any time if the prin-
cipal can demonstrate mental competency.
As an alternative to these ﬁduciary-based models, the principal could
also be allowed to place her assets in a safe harbor (see next subsection)
that eliminates the need for a ﬁduciary. This option would appeal to fami-
lies that do not have substantial assets and would therefore not ﬁnd the
appointment of a ﬁduciary to be cost-effective.
Mandating advance directives would pose several problems. First, it
might be perceived by some older adults as an unfair restriction targeted
against them. Second, the imposition of a ﬁduciary would create transac-
tions costs. Third, any attempt to deﬁne a safe harbor would be politically
contentious and would doubtless give rise to a great deal of lobbying. An
independent agency would probably be needed to partly insulate the safe
harbor regulations from political pressure.
V.G. Protected Assets: A Life-Cycle Safe Harbor
A portion of a retiree’s ﬁnancial assets could be protected in a manda-
tory safe harbor, with four basic features:
28
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the standard legal usage is relevant, since the firms managing these safe harbor assets and
following the relevant regulatory guidelines would be protected from lawsuits. Second,
the investors themselves would be protected from exploitation by those same regulatory
guidelines.
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all forms of savings that have beneﬁted from federal tax relief, such as
qualiﬁed deﬁned-contribution plans and all types of IRAs.
—Second, when the principal reaches a speciﬁed age, a portion of this
asset base would be irrevocably placed in a safe harbor account, that is,
one that is permitted to hold only certain types of assets. For example, at
age 59
1⁄2,
29 every account in the asset base could be required to distribute
50 percent of the balance into such an account. In principle, the safe harbor
accounts could be managed by the same company that managed the origi-
nal accounts, obviating the need for direct government involvement.
—Third, the investor would choose from among a limited range of
highly regulated, low-cost investment options for the assets within the safe
harbor. These options might include a ﬁxed annuity, a variable annuity, a
bond mutual fund, and a life-cycle mutual fund (which would contain a
diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks and bonds).
—Finally, the account would have a minimum and a maximum rate of
drawdown. The minimum rate could be set according to current rules on
required minimum distributions from tax-deferred accounts.
30 The maxi-
mum rate, which would rise with age, would be set to preserve the assets
so that they provide a nontrivial stream of retirement income until the prin-
cipal’s death.
Such a system would provide four beneﬁts. First, a substantial fraction
of the retiree’s assets would be protected from high fees, from suboptimal
investments, and from fraud. Second, the pooling of the assets in the safe
harbor into a small number of investment vehicles would achieve scale
economies and might mitigate adverse selection problems in the case of
annuitized assets. Third, retirees would be at least partly constrained from
spending down their assets prematurely. Fourth, society at large would
beneﬁt because household savings would cover a larger fraction of long-
term care and other medical expenses.
31
At ﬁrst glance, the proposal just described may seem novel. But it is
actually just a generalization of mandatory annuitization schemes that are
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29. This transfer to the safe harbor would occur just before early withdrawal penalties
are terminated at age 59
1⁄2. The transfer would incur no penalty, since the assets would
remain in the retirement savings system. Individuals who try to avoid the transfer to the safe
harbor by prematurely withdrawing assets from their tax-deferred accounts would face a
10 percent penalty.
30. Note that Roth IRAs are not currently covered by lifetime RMDs.
31. Under the proposal made here, fewer assets could be transferred during one’s life-
time to one’s children, and so those assets would be available to cover some of the long-term
care costs that would otherwise be borne by Medicaid.
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and Stewart 2008).
The proposal has two potential disadvantages. First, it would meaning-
fully restrict individual choice by requiring households to invest some of
their retirement savings in a limited menu of assets and by constraining
their consumption path. Second, it would create the potential for political
manipulation by empowering a regulator to select and monitor the asset
menu. As we argued above, an independent agency might be needed to
insulate the regulator.
V.H. Default Regulatory Approval: The Dietary Supplements Model
Up to this point we have focused on interventions that primarily target
the individual investor. Regulations could instead target the ﬁnancial prod-
ucts themselves. One such regime would mimic the regulatory model
currently used for nutritional supplements: new ﬁnancial products would
be allowed in the market without speciﬁc formal approval in advance but
would be monitored for adverse effects. The other, discussed in the next
subsection, would require that new ﬁnancial products obtain explicit regu-
latory approval before being marketed.
The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 established
a novel regulatory framework for nutritional supplements.
32 Unlike food
additives and drugs, dietary supplements do not need to be approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before being brought to market, nor
are they subject to formal requirements for ex ante safety and efﬁcacy test-
ing. Instead, the supplement manufacturer does its own due diligence,
applying safety and marketing rules that have been established by the FDA.
The manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that its supplement adheres
to these established regulatory standards for safety and truthful labeling.
The manufacturer does not even need to register the supplement with the
FDA. The FDA is responsible for taking action against any unsafe supple-
ments that it identiﬁes in the marketplace. Under this system, dietary sup-
plements thus have default regulatory approval.
Financial products could be regulated in much the same way. Safety
and quality standards would be established by the relevant regulator, typi-
cally the SEC, and ﬁnancial services ﬁrms would then evaluate their own
products to determine whether they comply with the standards. Such a sys-
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erals, botanical and herbal remedies, ﬁber, fatty acids, amino acids, and other substances
believed to improve health. The current regulatory regime is described on the FDA’s web-
page “Dietary Supplements” (www.fda.gov/Food/DietarySupplements/default.htm).
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review for each new product and would encourage innovation.
Naturally, this system would work well only if the regulator could suc-
cessfully identify socially optimal ex ante standards. This might be difﬁ-
cult. Such standards would need to be based both on the characteristics of
the product being marketed and on those of the buyer. For instance, prod-
ucts that might be appropriate for young investors (such as equity-based
leveraged ETFs) might be deemed inappropriate for an 85-year-old retiree.
V.I. Mandatory Explicit Regulatory Approval
The final regulatory approach draws on the model currently used by
the FDA for drugs (as opposed to dietary supplements). New drugs must
undergo extensive, documented testing for safety and efficacy and may
not be sold until formally approved by the FDA. This testing takes years
and is generally extremely costly to the pharmaceutical firm developing
the drug. Once approved, new drugs may be sold only by prescription
until the FDA formally approves them, in a separate process, for over-
the-counter sales.
Financial products could be made subject to such an ex ante review
process and tested in small-scale trials much as drugs are today. For exam-
ple, a new credit product could be offered (at regular cost) to 10,000 clients
during a trial period. Their behavior could be studied anonymously, and
they could be anonymously surveyed about their experiences. The survey
could be designed by the ﬁnancial regulator or outsourced to a third party
monitored by the regulator and could ask such questions as the following:
—Do you feel that this product generates value that exceeds the fees
you are paying for it?
—What are the fees on this product? (“Don’t know” would be an
option here.)
—Would you recommend this product to any of your friends?
—In your view, should this product be approved for sale?
Naturally, a product could be approved even if a sizable minority of
customers did not understand it or did not like it. However, if a large
enough fraction expressed reservations about its value or did not under-
stand its costs, this would be grounds for further study and possibly rejec-
tion. The regulator would try to judge the aggregate beneﬁts and harms
generated by the product, recognizing the possibility that modest harm to
many consumers might be offset by large gains to a small number.
Such testing would be socially costly. It would delay the release of
new products, increase costs for financial services firms, and discourage
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products. The net social beneﬁt is not easy to evaluate.
Finally, note that testing could occur after a product has been released.
For example, the regulator could be given the authority to compel a prod-
uct’s developer to perform the analysis described above on products that
have been found after their introduction to be potentially problematic. Such
ex post selection for testing might be superior to ex ante testing of all new
products. Financial service ﬁrms would have an incentive to design prod-
ucts that do not attract the potentially costly scrutiny of the regulator.
VI. Seven Open Questions for Future Research
This paper has undertaken three main tasks. First, we reported evidence that
older adults experience substantial declines in cognitive function over time.
Then, we reported evidence that economic behavior and economic mis-
takes show strong age-based patterns in the cross section, even among a
population of individuals who are screened to be prime borrowers. Finally,
we discussed nine potential policy responses. We emphasized that we are
agnostic about what regulatory interventions (if any) should be adopted.
We do not think that the jury is in on many different dimensions of the
problem. Economic behavior among older adults is still poorly understood.
Moreover, even if older adults are making substantial ﬁnancial mistakes, it
is not clear what a well-intentioned policymaker should do about it. Much
more research is needed—including ﬁeld experiments that study different
regulatory regimes—before the best solutions can be identiﬁed.
33 In this
concluding section we identify seven open questions that we hope aca-
demic researchers and policymakers will consider as they wrestle with
these problems in the future.
First, how widespread and important are losses due to poor ﬁnancial
decisionmaking? What fraction of aggregate wealth, and of the wealth of
older adults, is lost because of poor choices? What are the utility costs?
In our analysis of economic behavior, we were able to study only a set
of decisions with relatively moderate costs, such as credit card fees. We
believe that these costs are just the tip of the iceberg. We studied these par-
ticular transactions because the data are of good quality, but the bulk of the
mistakes that are probably being made lie elsewhere. Older adults make
many decisions with potentially enormous costs. Should I reﬁnance my
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Gill (2009) and Marotta-Wurgler (2007).
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(high-fee) annuity? Should I cash out my current annuity (paying a surren-
der charge) so I can buy a better one? Should I invest a substantial fraction
of my wealth in a high-return CD offered by a broker calling from an off-
shore bank? Should I invest a substantial fraction in a structured ﬁnance
product that has a high return and that I am assured is completely safe?
Should I participate in a real estate investment pool with a minimum
investment of $100,000?
Measuring and aggregating these costs is an important research pro-
gram. To get a sense of how they might add up, consider a few quantitative
examples. Wealth dissipation in the annuity market is estimated at about
6 percent of the value of each annuity purchased, for a total of $16 billion in
2008.
34 Korniotos and Kumar (forthcoming-a) estimate that older investors
with accounts at a discount brokerage earn 3 percent less in risk-adjusted
equity returns than middle-aged clients of the same broker. Even if the true
aggregate ﬁgure is just 0.3 percent of total ﬁnancial assets held by older
adults, this would translate into $40 billion of underperformance per year.
35
It is unclear whether these amounts are transfers between parties or
deadweight losses. As an order of magnitude for the stakes, Kenneth French
(2008) estimates total fees paid in active ﬁnancial management to be about
0.7 percent of the market value of equity per year, which is equivalent to
about 0.7 percent of GDP. This may mostly be a deadweight loss, because
the active traders (as well as the marketing experts who advertise these
funds) could be productively engaged in other activities. The active traders
are engaged primarily in trying (usually unsuccessfully) to transfer wealth
to their clients from other people. The transfers themselves are not a dead-
weight loss, but the time spent attempting to achieve those transfers is.
Physics Ph.D.s might be more usefully employed in labs rather than at
hedge funds.
Second, what demographic characteristics predict poor ﬁnancial deci-
sionmaking? In this paper we have used only data on age, but clearly other
demographic measures (years of education, ﬁeld of education) would be
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ity Sales Estimates, 1999–2008” (www.limra.com/PDFs/newscenter/databank/Annuity
Estimates99_08.pdf), for the volume of the annuities market. A typical commission on the
sale of an annuity ranges from 6 to 12 percent of the face value of the contract. Annuities
with small or zero commissions exist but represent a small part of the market.
35. The Federal Reserve estimates that households own financial assets worth about
$40 trillion, excluding deposits (Flow of Funds, table B.100). The Survey of Consumer
Finances implies that 34 percent of that wealth is owned by households with a head age 65
or older.
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of poor ﬁnancial decisionmaking, and if so, what kinds of tests (knowl-
edge-based, logic-based, or others). Is it possible to inexpensively and
accurately measure an individual’s current level of cognitive function or to
predict future changes?
Third, to what extent do people anticipate their own cognitive decline or
recognize it when it happens? And if they do, are they able to delegate their
ﬁnancial affairs or protect themselves in other ways (for example, by
politely ending the conversation when they are solicited over the phone to
attend a free lunch or investment seminar)? We do not know how malleable
older adults really are. One often hears anecdotes about aging widows who
vaguely realize that they are experiencing some cognitive decline but still
fall prey to sophisticated and sociable brokers. Are these stories represen-
tative? Or are the vast majority of older adults able to protect themselves
because they recognize their own vulnerability?
Fourth, does ﬁnancial education help? Is it cost-effective? Is it relevant
in a changing ﬁnancial environment? As discussed above, the evidence on
the impact of ﬁnancial education is mixed and not particularly encourag-
ing. For example, Agarwal and others (2009) ﬁnd that mortgage counsel-
ing does not help consumers choose lower-risk mortgage products.
Fifth, do third parties help? Who should be empowered to serve as
an external adviser or decisionmaker? A family member? a friend? an
independent trustee?
36 Family members sometimes make problematic
trustees—as  illustrated in cases ranging from King Lear to Brooke
Astor—but how prevalent are such problems? What is the evidence on the
effectiveness of different types of trustee? How does the market for ﬁdu-
ciaries operate?
Sixth, what is the market response to this situation, and does it help or
hurt? There are theoretical reasons to worry that the market mechanism
might be inefﬁcient in the market for advice. Advice markets suffer by def-
inition from information asymmetries between providers and recipients
(see the survey in Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). In markets with inat-
tentive consumers and shrouded attributes (Gabaix and Laibson 2006),
perverse situations with high fees can persist as bona ﬁde economic equi-
libria when there are enough naive consumers and the only proﬁtable busi-
ness model is to offer a product with low base prices and high “surprise”
fees. How important empirically are these perverse market equilibria? Are
professional ﬁduciaries trustworthy or not? There is much anecdotal evi-
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36. See Li (2009) for empirical evidence on ﬁnancial advice by family members.
11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 92dence of problems, for example of outrageously high fees, but a systematic
quantiﬁcation is needed.
Finally, what is the appropriate regulatory response? If the market for
third-party advice and fiduciary services functioned well, the market
equilibrium would have three phases. Early in life, each individual would
write a plan for his or her future consumption and investment, contingent
on major events (including cognitive decline). Then, cognitive testing
and observation would monitor the individual for the onset of significant
cognitive decline. Finally, once this prespecified threshold has been
crossed, the original contingent plan would be enforced by a fiduciary, or
the individual’s assets would be placed in a ﬁnancial instrument with a state-
contingent payout scheme. Indeed, the market already provides ﬁnancial
products with this feature: for example, annuities eliminate complex asset
decumulation decisions. More sophisticated institutions will be designed.
However, for all of the reasons reviewed in this paper, the unregulated
market solution may not work well. Government intervention is proba-
bly desirable, but the ideal form of that intervention remains unclear.
More empirical analysis and field experiments are needed to identify the





We use a proprietary panel dataset with data from several large financial
institutions, later acquired by a single financial institution that made
balance transfer offers nationally. The offers were not made conditional
on closing the old credit card account. The dataset contains information
on 14,798 individuals who accepted such balance transfer offers over
the period January 2000 through December 2002. The bulk of the data
consists of the main billing information listed on each account’s monthly
statement, including total payment, spending, credit limit, balance, debt,
purchase APRs, cash advance APRs, and fees paid. We also observe the
amounts of all balance transfers, the start and end dates of the balance
transfer teaser rate offer, and the initial teaser APR on the balance transfer.
At a quarterly frequency, we observe each customer’s credit bureau rating
(FICO) score and a proprietary (internal) credit “behavior” score. We have
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11941-03_Agarwal_rev2.qxd  1/26/10  11:30 AM  Page 93credit bureau data about the number of other credit cards held by each
accountholder, total credit card balances, and mortgage balances. We also
have data on the age, sex, and income of the accountholder, collected when
the account was opened. In this sample, borrowers did not pay a fee for bal-
ance transfers.
Home Equity Loans and Lines of Credit
We use a proprietary panel dataset constructed from records from a national
ﬁnancial institution that has issued home equity loans and home equity lines
of credit. This lender has not specialized in subprime loans or other market
segments. Between March and December 2002, the lender offered a menu
of standardized contracts for home equity credit.
37 Consumers chose either
a loan or a credit line, either a ﬁrst or a second lien, and an incremental
loan amount, which, given an estimate of the property’s value, resulted in an
LTV ratio of less than 80 percent, between 80 and 90 percent, or between
90 and 100 percent. Thus, in effect, the lender offered 12 different contract
choices.
38 We ran separate regressions for home equity loans and lines of
credit, conditioning in each case on not having a ﬁrst mortgage and on the
LTV ratio categories described above; hence, we control for contract type.
All loans have the same ﬁve-year maturity. For 75,000 such contracts, we
observe the contract terms, demographic information about the borrower
(age, years at current job, and home tenure), ﬁnancial information (income
and debt-to-income ratio), and risk characteristics (FICO score and LTV).
39
We also observe the borrower’s estimate of the property’s value and the
loan amount requested.
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37. Other interest rates in the economy varied considerably during this time period. One
might therefore ask whether the age results we report are an artifact of borrowers of different
ages happening to disproportionately borrow earlier or later in the sample. We observe no
pattern in the distribution by month of borrowing by age over the sample. In alternative versions
of the regressions including dummy variables for the month of loan origination, we obtain
nearly identical results.
38. We focus on APRs across contracts for four reasons. First, the contracts in the
dataset do not differ in points (origination fees as a percent of the loan) charged or in other
charges to the borrower. Second, we veriﬁed that even conditioning on contract choice,
some borrowers pay higher APRs than others. Third, we controlled for borrower risk char-
acteristics. Fourth, we show in the paper that the residual variation in APRs is explained by
the propensity to make an identiﬁable mistake in the loan acquisition process.
39. We do not have internal behavior scores (a supplementary credit risk score) for these
borrowers. Such scores are performance based and are thus not available at loan origination.
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We use a proprietary dataset of auto loans originated at several large
financial institutions that were later acquired by another institution. The
dataset comprises observations on 6,996 loans originated for the pur-
chase of new and used automobiles. Observed loan characteristics include
the automobile’s value and age, the loan amount and LTV, the monthly
payment, the contract rate, and the date of origination. Observed bor-
rower characteristics include credit score, monthly disposable income,
and age.
Mortgages
We use a proprietary dataset from a large ﬁnancial institution that originates
ﬁrst mortgages in Argentina. Using data from another country provides
suggestive evidence about the international applicability of our ﬁndings.
The dataset covers 4,867 owner-occupied, ﬁxed-rate, ﬁrst mortgage loans
originated between June 1998 and March 2000 and observed through
March 2004. We observe the original loan amount, the LTV and appraised
home value at origination, and the APR. We also observe borrower ﬁnan-
cial characteristics (including income, second income, years on the job,
and wealth measures such as second home ownership, car ownership, and
car value), risk characteristics (the borrower’s Veraz score—a credit score
similar to the U.S. FICO score—and mortgage payments as a percentage
of after-tax income), and demographic characteristics (age, sex, and mari-
tal status).
Small Business Credit Cards
We use a proprietary dataset of small business credit card accounts orig-
inated at several large institutions that issued such cards nationally. The
institutions were later acquired by a single institution. The panel dataset
covers 11,254 accounts originated between May 2000 and May 2002. Most
of the businesses are very small, are owned by a single family, and have no
public ﬁnancial records. The dataset has all the information collected at the
time of account origination, including the business owner’s self-reported
personal income, the number of years the business has been in operation,
and the age of the business owner. We also observe the quarterly credit
bureau score of the business owner.
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We use a proprietary panel dataset from several large ﬁnancial institutions
that offered credit cards nationally; these institutions were later acquired
by a larger ﬁnancial institution. The dataset contains a representative ran-
dom sample of about 128,000 credit card accounts followed monthly over
a 36-month period from January 2002 through December 2004.
40 The bulk
of the data consists of the main billing information listed on each account’s
monthly statement, including total payments, spending, credit limit, bal-
ance, debt, APRs on purchases and cash advances, and fees paid. At a
quarterly frequency, we observe each customer’s credit bureau (FICO)
score and a proprietary (internal) credit “behavior” score. For each card-
holder we have credit bureau data on the number of other credit cards held,
total credit card balances, and mortgage balances. We also have data on the
age, sex, and income of the cardholder, collected when the account was
opened. Further details, including summary statistics, are available in the
online appendix.
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40. The credit cards do not have annual fees and do not differ in terms of rewards points
or other beneﬁts.
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GIOVANNI DELL’ARICCIA1 Those whom the gods love die young.
Yet we grow old always learning new and interesting things. This paper by
Sumit Agarwal, John Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson does
some justice to both these statements. And like all good economic papers,
it identiﬁes a trade-off. You can be young and foolish: at the peak of your
cognitive abilities, but also very ignorant. Or you can be old and a bit slow:
having accumulated a lot of experience, but with depleted analytical capital.
In the middle is an “age of reason” at which you have learned enough and
are still able to exploit your experience and to process new information.
The paper argues that these dynamics are reﬂected in a life-cycle pattern of
ﬁnancial mistakes and performance. Its ﬁndings are relevant from a policy
perspective, especially given the continuing aging of the population in most
advanced economies. But I suspect they will be intriguing (and a bit scary)
even for those who are not particularly interested in economic policymaking
or behavioral ﬁnance.
I will structure my comments as follows. First, I will attempt to provide
alternative explanations for the main empirical patterns identified in the
paper. The authors present relatively convincing evidence linking the life-
cycle pattern of high interest rates paid and other financial mistakes to
progressive cognitive decline. However, it is worth exploring whether a
framework that does not rely on bounded rationality can produce a similar
pattern. In particular, I will focus on whether more standard, industrial
organization–based stories can deliver similar results. Second, I will delve
into how such a framework can explain the paper’s two most convincing
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pieces of empirical evidence: the “eureka moments” on credit card balance
transfers and the “rate-changing mistakes” on home equity loan applications.
Finally, I will brieﬂy discuss the paper’s policy implications.
The paper hypothesizes that net cognitive performance is hump-shaped
with respect to age. This results from assuming that performance is deter-
mined by the sum of analytical capital, which declines linearly with age, and
experiential capital, which rises with age but exhibits diminishing returns.
The question is whether other plausible stories or models can produce a
similar U-shaped life-cycle pattern in the pricing of financial products. 
I will propose two such stories, both of which borrow elements from the
literature on relationship lending. The ﬁrst examines how age can affect
the expected value of a bank-borrower relationship. The second looks at
how a bank’s ability to extract rents from a borrower may vary with the
borrower’s age. These models are not meant to be realistic or particularly
sophisticated. They are just simple examples of how some of the empirical
evidence in the paper could be explained with models of bank competition
that do not rely on bounded rationality.
Banks value lending relationships. One reason may be that having a
relationship with a customer makes it easier to sell additional products to
that customer. Or, in a more complex model, it may be that relationships
allow banks to gather valuable private information about the borrower.
This can explain the widespread practice of offering introductory teaser
rates on credit cards and other loans,
2 and that of offering attractive terms
to borrowers willing or likely to buy multiple products. For example,
according to the president of one major bank, in Europe before the cur-
rent crisis the margin on prime mortgages was so low that banks were
losing money on them. However, selling those mortgages brought in new
customers who would then buy wealth management services, trading
services, and the like.
Relationships, however, are not forever. They can be broken by exogenous
shocks, such as changes in the preferences or needs of the customer, or when
the customer moves or dies. The longer the expected life of a relationship,
the greater its value. The value of a relationship will also depend on the
degree to which it allows the bank to extract rents from the customer. The
higher the switching costs and informational barriers that prevent competing
lenders from successfully poaching each other’s customers, the more a
relationship is worth.
2. See Petersen and Rajan (1995) for evidence of how bank market power affects intro-
ductory rates.
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Consider now the following barebones model. Two banks compete on
the interest rate to extend loans to customers of equal creditworthiness but
different ages. Banks obtain proﬁts from these loans but also beneﬁt from
establishing a relationship with the customer. Relationships, however, can
be broken with probability θ by the death of the customer, or with proba-
bility µ by some other exogenous shock such as the customer moving to a
different state. θ is obviously increasing with age. But it is reasonable to
assume that µ is decreasing with age, since, for example, older people are
less likely to change jobs (left-hand panel of ﬁgure 1). Then, normalizing
the bank’s cost of funds to 1, the proﬁt from extending a loan at a gross
interest rate r is
where ϕ is the probability that the borrower will repay the loan, δ is the
discount factor, and V is the value of the relationship. With Bertrand com-
petition driving proﬁts to zero, in equilibrium we have
which, for a broad range of distribution functions for θ and µ, delivers 
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Source: Authorís model described in the text.
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Figure 1. A Model of the Bank-Customer Relationship over the Life Cycle
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in the paper (right-hand panel of figure 1). However, in this case the
age-dependent pattern reﬂects changes in the probability of an exogenous
interruption of the relationship rather than cognitive decline. If, in addition,
one assumes that middle-aged clients are those most likely to be interested
in multiple banking products (so that V follows a hump-shaped pattern
with respect to age), this pattern is reinforced further.
A model of bank competition under asymmetric information can deliver
a similar pattern. Consider another simple framework where banks learn
about their clients’ creditworthiness over the course of a relationship.
3
Further, assume that a portion λ of these borrowers are captives of their
bank in that they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to signal their credit quality to competing
lenders. It follows that inside lenders will charge the monopoly interest
rate, R, to the captive borrowers but will be forced to offer the competitive
rate, r, to those borrowers that can signal their quality. The average rate
observed on the market will then be a function of the proportion of captive
borrowers, r* =λR + (1 −λ )r. It is also reasonable to assume that the pro-
portion of captive borrowers is a function of age: young borrowers with
limited track records and credit histories, and older borrowers with few
current transactions, may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult than middle-aged borrowers
to signal their quality. Then, consistent with the evidence in the paper,
the average interest rate charged to borrowers will follow a U-shaped
pattern with respect to age.
These simple models show that a U-shaped pattern of interest rates
with respect to age can be generated with models of bank competition,
without resorting to unconventional assumptions. I now turn to the two
most convincing pieces of empirical evidence in the paper: the eureka
moments on credit card balance transfers and the rate-changing mistakes
on home equity loan applications. For these, my task is more difﬁcult.
Let me start with the eureka moments. A set of borrowers are offered
the opportunity to transfer their current credit card balances to a new card
charging a very low (teaser) interest rate on the transferred balance for a
limited period. The catch is that new purchases on the new card face a
high APR, and payments on the new card are credited ﬁrst to the trans-
ferred (low APR) balance. In that case the optimal strategy is to take
advantage of the low-interest-rate offer by transferring existing balances
but to continue to use the old card for new purchases. And the evidence
in the paper shows, after controlling for individual factors, that the per-
3. This is a common assumption in models of competition under asymmetric information.
See, for example, Sharpe (1990) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004).
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pattern with respect to age. Put differently, a higher proportion of middle-
aged than of younger and older borrowers discover the optimal strategy
and put it into practice.
The simple models described above cannot immediately explain this
pattern of ﬁnancial mistakes. Yet they are not necessarily irrelevant to the
issue. Consider the following argument. The paper implicitly assumes that
the interest rate charged on new purchases with the new card is higher than
the rate paid on the old credit card. If this is true, the proposed strategy is
indeed optimal. If not, things are more complicated, and it may be optimal
for borrowers to use the new card for at least some purchases. But the
authors’ dataset lacks information on the interest rates borrowers were
paying on their old cards. Consistent with the models above, it is not
unreasonable to assume that middle-aged people on average pay lower rates
on their existing credit cards and have greater access to low-interest-rate
credit cards or other low-cost sources of funds generally. Then the eureka
moment result could be explained in terms of a heterogeneity of optimal
strategies rather than of cognitive abilities. In fact, without information
about the rates paid on the old cards, the two explanations are observation-
ally equivalent.
Now let me turn to the evidence on rate-changing mistakes. The
authors find that the average interest rate paid by borrowers on home
equity loans follows the by-now-familiar U-shaped pattern with respect to
age. However, the pattern disappears for borrowers that provide a correct
estimate of the value of their home. Put differently, conditional on borrow-
ers applying for the “right” loan (one with the loan-to-value ratio appropri-
ate for their home), the interest rate they are charged is roughly constant
with respect to age. What drives the age pattern is the larger percentage
of younger and older applicant borrowers who grossly underestimate the
value of their home.
This is the strongest piece of evidence in support of the authors’ hypoth-
esis, and it is especially difﬁcult to explain with an industrial organization-
based model. Of course, one could argue that some borrowers make more
mistakes not because they are cognitively impaired or less experienced, but
because they have fewer opportunities to learn. For instance, borrowers
who interact more often with the banking system might receive multiple
loan offers and consequently have a more accurate estimate of the value of
their home. This group might consist disproportionately of middle-aged
borrowers. Alternatively, it might be that loan ofﬁcers are more willing to
suggest the optimal strategy to their more valuable customers, who are again
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standard and represent a much more convoluted explanation of the evidence
than the cognitive decline model.
Finally, I want to turn brieﬂy to the policy implications of the paper.
Obviously these depend on the mechanism one believes is at play. I believe
the authors present convincing evidence that cognitive decline is at least
partly responsible for the documented life-cycle pattern in ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. That said, the authors are rightly cautious when it comes to policy
recommendations. In addition to the alternative possible explanations for
the evidence (such as those discussed above), there is the question of how
economically signiﬁcant the identiﬁed age effects are. The paper reports
relatively small economic damages associated with aging, which would
not by themselves justify ad hoc regulatory intervention. However, as the
authors argue, these costs may be the tip of the iceberg. Financial vulnera-
bility in old age is a much broader issue, including exposure to outright
fraud that can put one’s entire life savings at risk.
Perhaps more important, several of the more paternalistic proposals
in the paper can infringe on individual freedom. This raises two questions.
The ﬁrst is one of principle: Should society constrain an individual’s right to
control her own wealth just because she belongs to a group that is statisti-
cally more likely to make ﬁnancial mistakes? What if similar results were
found for groups identiﬁed by sex, or ethnicity, or education? The second
question is a practical one: Several of the policies discussed in the paper
would likely be difficult to implement, or politically infeasible, or both.
After all, as Karen Pence documents in her discussion of this paper, the
United States imposes very few restrictions on driving by senior citizens,
even though the externalities are far more evident. That said, the evidence
in the paper could be safely used to provide guidance for resource allocation
in the context of consumer protection programs. For example, education
and efforts against predatory lending could be targeted to more vulnerable
areas and groups.
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KAREN M. PENCE Older and younger individuals are more likely to
pay higher prices for ﬁnancial products than individuals in their middle
years. Sumit Agarwal, John Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson
document this fact in several consumer ﬁnance markets, including markets
for mortgages, credit cards, and auto loans. The age-related pattern holds
after controlling for other features of the credit contracts and for borrowers’
other demographic, ﬁnancial, and risk characteristics, suggesting that older
and younger individuals could have paid less than they did. I follow the
authors in labeling this phenomenon a “mistake,” although determining this
with certainty would require knowledge of the full range of each borrower’s
options, which is lacking.
The authors assemble evidence from the medical, psychological, and
economic literatures that suggests that older individuals make mistakes
because of declining cognitive ability, whereas younger individuals appear
to make mistakes because of inexperience. Although both groups are more
prone than middle-aged individuals to make mistakes, the paper focuses
primarily on the ﬁnancial decisionmaking of older individuals.
The authors explore a range of possible regulatory responses, including
doing nothing, requiring a financial “driver’s license” to invest in non-
standard products, strengthening the fiduciary duties of financial sales-
people, and requiring explicit regulatory approval of ﬁnancial products. The
authors decline to take a stand on which interventions, if any, are desirable.
The empirical work in this paper is clear and convincing, and the authors
place their findings in a broad and rich context. However, many of the
possible regulatory responses may prove politically unpalatable: the polit-
ical system seems reluctant to impose restrictions on the behavior of older
individuals, even when such restrictions may be warranted. I describe below
two situations in which both younger and older individuals are more likely
to make mistakes, yet regulations are considerably more comprehensive
for younger than for older individuals.
DRIVING. Teenage drivers and older drivers are both more likely than
other drivers to be involved in car crashes (Liu, Utter, and Chen 2007).
As drivers age, the advantage of their greater experience is eventually
outweighed by physical factors such as degradation of reﬂexes, vision, and
hearing, and decreases in strength, mobility, and ability to process infor-
mation (Islam and Mannering 2006). In addition, because of their relative
frailty, older drivers are more likely to be injured or killed in a crash: drivers
65 or older have almost three times the odds of drivers 24 or younger of
being seriously injured in an auto accident (Liu and others 2007).
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The top panel of ﬁgure 1 shows driver deaths by age, scaled by billions of
miles driven by members of the age group. The age-related pattern is
dramatic: on average, 34 drivers aged 16 and 17, 5 drivers in their forties,
and 96 drivers age 85 or older were killed per billion miles driven over the
1999–2003 period.
Source: Author’s calculations from data in Tefft (2008).
a. Persons killed in auto accidents who were not riding in an automobile.
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Figure 1. Automobile Fatalities by Driver Age, 1999–2003
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The bottom panel of the ﬁgure shows nonmotorist (such as pedestrian)
deaths by driver age, again scaled by billions of miles driven. This ﬁgure iso-
lates the age-related pattern due to driver error rather than the relative frailty
of older drivers. The pattern is still apparent but is less dramatic: on average
7 nonmotorists were killed by drivers aged 16 and 17, about 2 were killed by
drivers in their forties, and 5 were killed by drivers aged 85 or older.
Figure 1 suggests that the argument for age-based regulation of driving
is compelling. And indeed, states are highly involved in regulating teenage
driving. Almost all have adopted a form of “graduated licensing,” which
includes some combination of a learner’s period during which parents may
have to certify a certain amount of supervised driving, and an intermediate
period during which night driving and teenage passengers may be prohib-
ited or limited (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 2009a).
States regulate older drivers, however, with a substantially lighter touch.
Twenty-four states place no restrictions on older drivers, and in Tennessee,
licenses issued to drivers 65 years or older never expire (Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety 2009b). Four states and the District of Columbia forbid
licensing administrators to treat people differently solely on the basis of
advanced age, and only New Hampshire and Illinois require road tests for
older drivers.
CREDIT CARDS. As the paper documents, both younger and older individ-
uals appear to pay higher credit card interest rates and fees than those in
between. Policymakers and consumer groups have also raised concerns
about the use of credit cards by students and the elderly, but only the con-
cerns about the former have been translated into law.
1
Legislation enacted in 2009 imposes broad changes on the credit card
industry. The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure
Act has no provisions speciﬁc to the elderly, but it does place signiﬁcant
restrictions on the access of young borrowers to credit cards. An applicant
under the age of 21 may open a credit card account only with a co-signer
age 21 or older, unless the applicant submits evidence of independent means
to repay. Issuers are not allowed to send unsolicited prescreened credit offers
to individuals under the age of 21, and they may not increase the credit
lines of accounts with a co-signer without the co-signer’s permission.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS. The above two examples suggest that policymakers
and the public are comfortable protecting young individuals from their
1. See General Accounting Office (2001) for an overview of the issues surrounding
students and credit cards, and García (2007) for an example of concern about older house-
holds’ credit card debt.
11941-04_Agarwal Comment_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:31 AM  Page 110inexperience, but are less comfortable protecting older individuals from
their declining mental or physical abilities. Thus, popular support may be
low for many of the regulatory responses outlined in this paper.
Perhaps support would be higher if the costs of the ﬁnancial mistakes
that older people make were more apparent. This paper cannot make that
case, because the costs of the mistakes the authors identify are not particu-
larly large. For example, they show that older borrowers pay perhaps $5 to
$20 more in credit card rates and fees than middle-aged borrowers. In the
most costly example of the 10 that the authors document, older borrowers
may pay around $250 more on their home equity lines annually than
middle-aged borrowers.
In contrast, mistakes that older households make in managing and
investing their retirement savings may have significant quality-of-life
consequences. As the authors note, more research is needed about the con-
sequences of these and other mistakes for policymakers to formulate appro-
priate regulatory responses. However, research alone may not be enough.
For example, the costs of driving by the elderly are large and well measured,
but the policy response does not seem commensurate.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Linda Goldberg said she accepted the idea
that experience rises with age while cognitive abilities decline, and she
found the evidence for a U-shape of costs persuasive. She was not yet
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regarding the self-selection of borrowers: are older borrowers different from
the rest of the older population, given that the general expectation, from a
life-cycle perspective, is for borrowers to be younger? She also observed
that with product bundling, customers purchasing the most sophisticated or
broadest set of products might be offered lower interest rates. Also, other
issues relating to supply of credit need to be controlled for before deciding
whether regulation or some other policy is appropriate.
Robert Hall conceded that there are quite noticeable age effects in
financial performance, but he noted that the correlation is very low: one
can easily think of extreme outliers, like Warren Buffett. The paper’s
results might be more powerful if expressed in terms of a relationship to
some aptitude score rather than to age. With respect to mortgages, the
presumption is that the amount a person pays depends on the cost of
serving that person as well as on the person’s skill in choosing financial
products. For example, the U-shaped relationship between mortgage
expense and age might reflect higher costs of originating mortgages for
the young and the old.
Hall also noted that mandatory mortgage counseling appears to have
been quite successful at improving consumers’ choice of a mortgage. Apart
from that, however, Hall shared the general frustration with the lack of
good policy options, particularly regarding labeling and disclosure. The only
kind of labeling that might provide a useful model, he thought, is nutrition
labeling, for which some excellent research was done to determine the
absolute minimum amount of information necessary and how to present it.
The so-called Schumer box now required of credit card issuers should look
like the nutrition label on the side of a box of cereal, but instead it is
lengthy and difﬁcult to read. Hall concluded that there is still a long way to
go on disclosure, but he doubted that even better disclosure would do
much to resolve the problem.
Alan Blinder observed that the authors were very agnostic about reme-
dies, almost to the point of suggesting that nothing will work, and he
urged a little less agnosticism. He suggested a distinction between poli-
cies that rely on engaging the brain through improving financial literacy
or greater disclosure, and policies that are more paternalistic, such as
good default options, nudges, and fiduciary standards, which he thought
the paper too easily dismissed. Blinder disputed the contention that
stockbrokers are obligated only to avoid misrepresentation. There is a
suitability standard for brokers, which prohibits them from pressuring
112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2009
11941-04_Agarwal Comment_rev.qxd  1/26/10  11:31 AM  Page 112anyone, let alone the elderly, into inappropriate investments. He agreed,
however, that there is a lot of room to raise fiduciary standards and pre-
vent abuse.
Christopher House agreed with Goldberg that differences in performance
across age per se do not seem to be the key, and he suggested that it would
be better to think in terms of the level of cognitive ability. He further
observed that although cognitive ability does decline with age, there are
often other people present who have the interests of an aging household in
mind. For example, just as parents encourage their children to drive safely,
save their money, and choose a good subject for their major, so the grown
children of older people often give them advice about ﬁnances and other
important decisions. The presence of these familial supports complicates
the situation and argues for caution in devising a regulatory structure that
might interfere with these supports.
Benjamin Friedman also urged a clearer distinction between nudges and
disclosure, especially if the authors generally approve of the former and
are skeptical of the latter. The discussion of nudges in the paper reminded
Friedman that in the recent book Nudge by Cass Sunstein and Richard
Thaler, many of the proposed nudges amounted to no more than disclo-
sure. Friedman was also skeptical of the idea that small-scale trials
would be very informative. A mantra of the ﬁnancial industry is that secu-
rities are not bought; they are sold. In a small-scale trial, however, ﬁrms
lack the incentive to develop the well-ﬁnanced marketing effort to sell
securities or other ﬁnancial products to people who otherwise would not
buy them. Thus, if a small-scale trial suggests that a given intervention
leads only a few people to buy an inappropriate product, that sheds little
light on what will happen when the industry is unleashed on a large popula-
tion of prospective buyers and thus has an incentive to sell aggressively.
Christopher Sims argued that not enough is known about the process by
which younger people start taking over decisionmaking for their elderly
relatives, and especially what happens to people who lack educated, ﬁnan-
cially well off, or even living children to take care of them. The issue goes
well beyond ﬁnance. When a person gets Alzheimer’s, for example, even-
tually not only ﬁnancial decisions become difﬁcult, but also what to eat in
the morning, what to wear, and how to maintain one’s home. Adding to the
problem is that Alzheimer’s patients often lose all perspective on their
abilities. A further problem is that some charities seem to increase the fre-
quency of their requests for contributions addressed to older people,
because they know that elderly people, especially those with Alzheimer’s,
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tively wealthy households, the ﬁnancial impact of this practice may be as
important as the credit card issues discussed in the paper.
Christopher Carroll framed his comment by quoting the philosopher
Isaiah Berlin, who said that one of the most important individual rights
is the right to make your own mistakes. Any rigorous investigation into
optimal ﬁnancial regulation has to take into account the fact that people
often learn valuable lessons from their mistakes. Indeed, this could be one
reason why the experience proﬁle is so sharply upward sloping. Berlin’s
point is less persuasive, however, with respect to decisions that one cannot
easily revisit, such as lifetime saving decisions. This suggests that the need
for regulation of financial products should depend in part on whether
the transaction is likely to be a one-time event, or one that is likely to be
repeated with the beneﬁt of learning.
Justin Wolfers thought the paper should do more to highlight not just
the types of mistakes being made and their relationship to the life cycle,
but also the consequences of those mistakes. He observed further that the
economics profession at the moment is thinking a lot about methodology,
and in particular about what contributes to making results “robust.” The
present paper gathers a wealth of evidence across many different decisions
and different datasets, which adds robustness in a different sense than
adding another control variable. It is a wonderful case study in that respect.
The paper also succeeds in identifying examples of behavior that are
unambiguously suboptimal. For example, when using a credit card with a
teaser rate to which one has transferred a balance, it is absolutely clear that
one should not use that credit card for purchases. There is no possible story
where such a transaction represents a rational decision.
Ricardo Reis suggested two explanations for why there are more legal
restrictions on the young than on the old. First, the old vote and the young
do not. Second, when a teenager has a horizon of 60 or 70 years of driving
ahead but is prohibited from driving for the ﬁrst 3, the cost does not seem
as high as when a 65-year-old with 15 years of expected life ahead is 
prevented from driving. This may be what leads older people to resist
restrictions on their actions more than the young. Reis also stressed the
distinction between ﬁduciary duties and regulatory authority. The authors
drew a parallel between ﬁnancial products and medicines, but Reis believed
the right model for ﬁnancial products was much closer to prescription
drugs than to over-the-counter drugs. Prescription drugs must be approved
for sale by the FDA, but in addition they have to be recommended by a
doctor for each patient individually and prescribed in the right doses. The
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Similarly, any governmental authority approving a ﬁnancial product will
always have to rely ultimately on the broker or seller bearing some ﬁduciary
responsibilities.
Reis added that there is a separate question about ﬁduciary responsibil-
ity in the health ﬁeld, namely, whether doctors are making poor ﬁnancial
decisions for their patients and for taxpayers. Doctors are trained for 15 years
and indoctrinated into thinking about their patients ﬁrst; they take an oath to
do so and can be not only disbarred but jailed for a wrong medical decision.
Yet there is no comparable sanction for their decisions that go against the
ﬁnancial interest of a patient, not to mention that of the taxpayer.
Alan Auerbach disagreed with Reis’s comparison, arguing that there is
a big difference between making a decision in the interest of a patient and
making a decision in the interest of the taxpayer. Although this setup is one
reason for the current problems in the health care system, it can be fully
rational and in the interest of the patient for the doctor to make a decision
against the taxpayer’s interest. Justin Wolfers added, with respect to the FDA
analogy, that off-label drug use is enormous. Medicines may be approved
for one use, yet most of the sales of that drug may end up being used for
something else. Much the same thing could well happen under stronger
ﬁnancial regulation.
Chang-Tai Hsieh wondered whether the phenomenon that the paper
identiﬁed is big or small. He suggested two possible dimensions for gauging
its importance. First, is the choice of a ﬁnancial product among the most
important decisions a person makes, or merely one of many important
decisions? People might, for example, be making serious mistakes in other
areas, such as schooling for their children, or what kind of home to buy.
The potential welfare consequences from these mistakes could be even
larger than those from poor ﬁnancial decisions. Second, is age really the
most important source of variation in cognitive ability? Suppose one could
administer a test that accurately measures that variation, and in particular
how much of the variance can be explained by age. The latter result, Hsieh
predicted, is likely to be small; other considerations, such as differences in
income, might well be more important.
Timothy Besley suggested looking not just at mean differences between
age groups, but also at the variance. One reason why there is less resis-
tance to intervening with the young could be that competence at ﬁnancial
decisionmaking is fairly tightly distributed within some age groups: most
young people are more or less equally bad at making such decisions, but
the distribution seems to fan out as people get older. This would have dif-
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Besley also observed that what matters is the margin and not the average:
the paper’s results support doing something about both the old and the
young, but they do not yet imply that the marginal return to intervening
with those groups is highest. Besley argued further that one should not
give up on the role of tort law in resolving some of these issues. To be sure,
not all regulatory issues can be resolved in court ex post, but ﬁnes and other
standard tort mechanisms do have their place.
Robert Hall responded by suggesting that in the United States the tort
system effectively does not apply to ﬁnancial products at all. Most ﬁnan-
cial products sold in this country require that the buyer sign a mandatory
arbitration agreement. This protects the providers of ﬁnancial products from
liability but amounts, in Hall’s view, to the forfeiture of tort rights by the
purchaser. Christopher Carroll countered that although at present there is
no effective role for the court system in ﬁnancial matters, that does not
mean that it is not a useful thing to contemplate. In fact, he noted, one large
credit card issuer recently claimed to have moved away from the arbitration
requirement.
Karen Dynan seconded Hsieh’s comment on the importance of measur-
ing the costs of people’s ﬁnancial mistakes. Regulation is not costless; the
question for policy is whether the losses associated with it are worth bear-
ing. Dynan said she was sympathetic to the view that cognitive abilities
decline with age, but she offered an alternative possible explanation for the
paper’s results: older people might put less time and effort into ﬁnancial
decisions because of shifting priorities. Many people toward the end of life
say they wish they had spent less time working. They might say the same
thing about trying to ﬁgure out exactly the right interest rate on a credit
card. It would be interesting to see whether older people do try as hard as
younger ones when making ﬁnancial decisions.
William Nordhaus commented that the paper reminded him of certain
issues in the energy area, where there are also well-documented inefﬁcien-
cies, the reasons for which are poorly understood. He saw three similarities
across the two sets of issues. First, the inefficiencies are stubborn and
do not disappear over time. For well over three decades now, the United
States has had various policies in place to improve energy efﬁciency, yet
ﬁrst-price bias in the purchasing of automobiles and the overdiscounting of
fuel use appear almost as prevalent today as when they were ﬁrst investi-
gated in the 1970s. No one should underestimate how difﬁcult it will be to
change this kind of behavior. Second, careful labeling of energy-consuming
goods like appliances appears to have made some difference, but it is
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of behavioral studies. Third, one should never underestimate Congress’s
ability to devise very poor, heavily interventionist policies. When designing
new ﬁnancial regulations, policymakers would do well to remember that
the SUV was invented basically to get around energy regulations and fuel
economy standards. The ability and the incentives of ﬁnancial engineers to
devise the ﬁnancial equivalent of SUVs should not be taken lightly.
George Perry wondered whether, instead of allowing certain products to
be sold but forbidding certain groups of people to buy them, the solution
might be to place restrictions on what is available for anyone to buy. This
would raise obvious issues of freedom of choice, but on the other hand no
one disagrees that the Bernie Madoffs of the world should be put in jail and
should not be allowed to peddle fraudulent goods. Perry noted that banks
continue to charge outrageous fees on debit card overdrafts, and on card
accounts generally, and although the amounts are small compared with the
loss of one’s home, they are nonetheless considerable. Perry could think of
no other area where regulation permits what is universally agreed to be an
unfair price, yet companies remain free to set these unconscionable fees.
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